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PASSION, POLITICS AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST: THE
PERILOUS PATH TO A QUANTITATIVE STANDARD IN THE
REGULATION OF CHILDREN'S TELEVISION
PROGRAMMING
James J. Popham*
According to the brave description of American admin-
istrative law scholars, the FCC is called an "independent
agency." This means that formally we belong neither to
the Executive branch - we are not a Cabinet agency
nor report to one - nor to the Legislative Branch.
Rather, we follow a statutory mandate from the Con-
gress, and have staff of civil servants to carry it out.
So much for the theory.'
Regulation of television programming reached
a watershed with the adoption of the Federal
Communications Commission's ("FCC" or "Com-
mission") latest rules implementing the Chil-
dren's Television Act of 1990 ("Act"). 2 For the
first time since the FCC deregulated broadcast
services over a decade ago,3 the Commission de-
fined one element of a broadcast television sta-
tion licensee's obligation to operate in the public
interest in quantitative terms.4 It adopted a so-
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the interests of stations not affiliated with the three
established networks (ABC, CBS and NBC). Mr. Popham
previously served as Vice-President, Congressional Relations
and Deputy General Counsel of the National Association of
Broadcasters (1972-82). The author wishes to thank Jo P.
Popham, Legal Assistant in the CBS Washington Law
Department for her invaluable research, insight, editorial
assistance, support and encouragement in the preparation of
this article. The views expressed are strictly those of the
author.
I FCC Chairman Reed E. Hundt, Reshaping Regulation,
Remarks Before the Munich Circle Conference I (Sept. 25,
1995) (challenging the theory that the FCC is an independ-
ent agency) [hereinafter Hundt Munich Conference Remarks].
2 In re Policies and Rules Concerning Children's Televi-
sion Programming and Revision of Programming Policies for
Television Broadcast Stations, Report and Order, 11 FCC Rcd
10660 (1996) (implementing rules for the Children's Televi-
sion Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-437, 104 Stat. 996-1000,
codified at 47 U.S.C. §§ 303a, 303b, 394 (1994)) [hereinafter
1996 Report and Order ].
3 See e.g., In re The Revision of Programming and Com-
mercialization Policies, Ascertainment Requirements, and
Program Log Requirements for Commercial Television Sta-
called processing guideline which essentially pro-
vides that television stations which broadcast
three hours-per-week of programming "specifi-
cally designed" to serve the educational and infor-
mational needs of children will be found in com-
pliance with the their general obligation under
the Act.5 The new rules emerged from a titanic
struggle in which quantification became the focal
issue. Children's advocates touted quantification
as the only effective means of provoking the
broadcast industry to increase the amount of edu-
cational programming for children.6 Broadcast-
ers saw quantification as anathema, an intrusive
government edict intolerable under the First
Amendment." Now, the zealous advocates of
quantification are trumpeting a significant vic-
tions, Report and Order, 98 F.C.C.2d 1076, 1077 (1984) ("con-
clud[ing] that modifications to the existing regulatory system
are appropriate . . . [and that] market incentives will ensure
the presentation of programming that responds to commu-
nity needs and provide [sic] sufficient incentives for licensees
to become and remain aware of the needs and problems in
their communities.") [hereinafter 1984 Commercialization Re-
port and Order].
4 1996 Report and Order, supra note 2, para. 1.
5 Id. para. 115; see also Broadcast Services; Children's Tel-
evision, 61 Fed. Reg. 43,981, 43,998 (1996) (to be codified at
47 CFR § 73.671(c)). The other salient feature of the Com-
mission's order was a new, strict definition of "programming
specifically designed to serve the educational and informa-
tional needs of children," which the Commission has chosen
to refer to as "core" educational programming. 1996 Report
and Order, paras. 73-76.
6 See, e.g., Comments of Center for Media Education to
the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking in MM Dkt. No. 93-48, at 11-
14, 17 (Oct. 16, 1995).
7 See, e.g., Comments of the National Association of
Broadcasters to the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking in MM Dkt.
No. 93-48, at 26 (Oct. 16, 1995) [hereinafter NAB Comments].
In the ultimate compromise NAB undoubtedly swallowed
hard in accepting even a quantitative processing guideline.
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tory.8 At the same time, many who have carried
the banner of broadcasters' resistance to quantifi-
cation over the years are wondering why an idea
successfully resisted for so long suddenly gained
sufficient momentum to become enshrined in the
FCC rules.9
The simple answer is a confluence of passion-
ately .pursued good intentions and effectively
leveraged political forces which gave quantifica-
tion unprecedented momentum. Neither of
these factors, however, assure a sound result. To
the contrary, they raise danger signals which dic-
tate an especially skeptical attitude about the re-
sults they have spawned. 10 Furthermore, the new
rules are the product of raw political compromise.
This also prompts questions and a concern that
tenets of sound decisionmaking have been aban-
doned in favor of political expediency." A final
reason for concern arises from the nature of the
debate. Despite some extraordinarily fruitful mo-
ments, the FCC's deliberations over the quantifi-
cation question often better resembled a bench
8 Harry A. Jessell, Peggy Charren: Victory at Long Last,
BROADCASTING & CABLE, Aug. 12, 1996, at 20.
9 No doubt ought to exist that in the matter of quantita-
tive standards, for both sides, it was indeed "the principle of
the thing." As a practical matter, the magnitude of the vic-
tory on one side and the defeat on the other appears margi-
nal. Indeed, the victory may well be pyrrhic for children's
advocates. For broadcasters, the defeat in practical terms
may well better resemble a victory when all is said and done.
10 As former Commissioner Glen Robinson once ob-
served in this very context:
There is an especially seductive appeal to the idea of
"protecting" children against television. There are areas
where the prospect of governmental control of program-
ming has only to be suggested to evoke opposition and
antipathy. This is not one of them. It is with respect to
children's television that our strongest instinct is to
reach out and put the clamp of governmental control on
programming. For this reason, regulation of children's
programming raises the most subtle and the most sensi-
tive of problems. Everyone recognizes the free speech
dangers of governmental control of political broadcast-
ing. Not enough people appreciate the far more subtle
problem of governmental control when it is extended
into an area like this one, where there is widespread
popular sentiment supporting some measure of govern-
mental control. But if the First Amendment is to mean
anything at all, it obviously does not mean that we can
make judgments on the basis of majoritarian sentiment
alone.
In re Petition of Action for Children's Television (ACT) for
Rule Making Looking Toward the Elimination of Sponsor-
ship and Commercial Content in Children's Programming
and the Establishment of a Weekly 14 Hour Quota of Chil-
dren's Television Programs, Children's Television Report and
Policy Statement, 50 F.C.C.2d 1, 37 (1974) (separate statement
of Commissioner Glen 0. Robinson) [hereinafter 1974 Chil-
clearing brawl between two minor league teams
struggling to stay out of last place on the final day
of the season, than a rational exchange among
principled advocates on the opposing sides of the
issue.
I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF CHILDREN'S
TELEVISION PROGRAM REGULATION
The issue of quantifying local television sta-
tions' obligation to provide educational and infor-
mational programming for children hardly was
new to the Commission in 1996. More than
twenty-five years ago, the same parties which pro-
claimed victory on August 8, petitioned the FCC
to require stations to broadcast fourteen hours
per week of children's programming.12 Ten
months later a divided Commission issued a No-
tice of Inquiry and Notice of Proposed Rule Mak-
ing, thereby initiating a proceeding which was to
last for thirteen years.13 Foreshadowing the con-
troversy which was to dog the issue, three commis-
dren's Television Report and Policy Statement].
II Such compromises also reduce the prospects for judi-
cial review. In this case, the most likely antagonist of the
Commission's new rules, the National Association of Broad-
casters, has committed not to seek judicial review, despite its
long-standing hostility to any form of quantitative standard.
Letter from Edward 0. Fritts, President, National Association
of Broadcasters, to The Honorable William J. Clinton, Presi-
dent of the United States 1 (July 28, 1996) (on file with Com-
mLaw Conspectus).
12 See In re Petition of Action for Children's Television
(ACT) for Rulemaking Looking Toward the Elimination of
Sponsorship and Commercial Content in Children's Pro-
gramming and the Establishment of a Weekly 14 Hour Quota
of Children's Television Programs, Notice of Inqui7y and Notice
of Proposed Rule Making, 28 FCC 2d 368, 368-69 (1971) (refer-
ring to Petition for Rule Making of the ACT, RM 1569 (Feb. 5,
1970) [hereinafter 1971 Notice]. Ten years earlier, the FCC's
first recognition of a licensee's responsibility to provide pro-
gramming which served the needs of children. Report and
Statement of Policy Re: Commission En Banc Programming Inquiry,
44 FCC 2303 (1960). The ACT petition further requested
that neither sponsorship of nor commercials on children'
programming be allowed and that performers on children'
programming be forbidden to mention products, services, or
stores during children's programming. Id. With respect to
children's programming, ACT asked that programming be
directed to specific age groups during specified dayparts
(e.g., primary, ages 6-9, programming between 4 p.m. and 8
p.m. daily and between 8 a.m. and 8 p.m. on weekends). Id.
13 1971 Notice, supra note 12. This proceeding ended in
1984. In re Children's Television Programming and Advertis-
ing Practices, Report and Order, 96 F.C.C.2d 634, para. 46
(1984), affd sub nom., Action for Children's Television v. FCC,
756 F.2d 899 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (ACT II) [hereinafter 1984 Pro-
gramming Report and Order].
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sioners dissented, while one of the four commis-
sioners voting to issue the notice lamented that
the Commission had compiled a massive record
over the preceding ten months, but had failed to
make any specific proposals.14
The fundamental conflict between the First
Amendment objections to specific Commission
rules, as advanced by broadcast and advertising in-
terests, and protecting and promoting the inter-
ests of children, was acknowledged and articu-
lated by the Commission:
In support of their First Amendment and Section 326
contentions, the parties so arguing cite a number of
well-known cases . . . . We recognize the importance
and significance of these pronouncements and the con-
cepts expressed in them. It may be that, ultimately, we
will conclude that they substantially limit otherwise ap-
propriate Commission actionin this area. But it is also
apparent that there are high public interest considera-
tions involved in the use of television, perhaps the most
powerful communications medium ever devised, in re-
lation to a large and important. segment of the audi-
ence, the nation's children.1 5
When all was said and done, the Commission
had amassed a sixty-three volume file of formal,
informal comments, and data plus 1,252 pages of
transcript from three days of panel discussions
and three more days of oral argument.' 6 .
Nine months after the oral arguments, the
Commission adopted its Children's Television Re-
14 1971 Notice, supra note 12, at 373 (concurring opinion
of Commissioner Nicholas Johnson). Commissioner John-
son also complimented the unprecedented interest of con-
servative Republican FCC Chairman Dean Burch in the mat-
ter of children's television:
Chairman Burch has taken a leading role in attempts to
bring Big Broadcasting closer to a realization of its awe-
some responsibility for one of our nation's most pre-
cious resources: our children. He invited the ACT
members to an almost unprecedented personal presen-
tation by private citizens of their concerns to the Com-
missioners. He supported putting their proposal out for
comment. He has delivered public speeches to broad-
casters and written article [sic] on the subject He has
met privately with network executives.
Id. at 374.
15 Id. paras. 6-7.
16 1974 Children's Television Report and Policy Statement,
supra note 10, paras. 4-6.
17 Id. at 1.
18 Id. para. 20.
19 Id. paras. 20, 22. The Commission added that "we ex-
pect to see a reasonable amount of programming which is
particularly designed with an educational goal in mind." Id.
para. 22. Examples of such programming noted by the Com-
mission were Captain Kangaroo, Multiplication Rock, and Wild
Kingdom. Id. at 7 n.8.
20 Id. para. 25
21 Id. para. 26.
port and Policy Statement.1 7  No rule requiring
stations to broadcast a certain amount of chil-
dren's programming was adopted.18 However,
the Commission left no doubt that serving the
child audience was an essential element of a licen-
see's public interest obligation. The Commission
called for a "meaningful effort" with respect to
presenting overall children's programming and
stated that "license renewal applications should
reflect a reasonable amount of programming
which is designed to educate and inform - and
not simply to entertain."19 With respect to age-
specific programming the Commission declined
to require any particular breakdown of program-
ming among age groups, but again stated its ex-
pectation that "all licensees make a meaningful ef-
fort in this area."2 0 Finally, the Commission
noted that most children's programming was
broadcast on Saturday and Sunday mornings.21 It
called this scheduling pattern unreasonable and
said it expected "to see considerable improve-
ment in scheduling practices in the future."22
The industry was given until January 1, 1976, to
come into full compliance with the new policy. 23
The Commission also kept the proceeding open
to permit it to monitor and evaluate industry per-
formance under the new policy statement and
22 Id. para. 27.
23 Id. para. 58. With respect to advertising, the Commis-
sion adopted no rule prohibiting advertising during chil-
dren's programming, but noted that if it had done so, it
likely would have considered a quantitative programming re-
quirement necessary. Id. para. 19. The Commission deter-
mined instead to rely on industry self-regulation to reduce
advertising voluntarily, in the form of the now-defunct NAB
Television Code, and an agreement by the Association of In-
dependent Television Stations, Inc. ("INTV"). Id. para. 42
n.12. The Commission also required stations to employ
"[s]pecial measures ... to insure that an adequate separa-
tion [between program content and commercial messages] is
maintained on programs designed for children." Id. para.
49. The NAB Code was abolished in 1982 following a Depart-
ment ofJustice antitrust suit. Broadcasters Reconsider Voluntary
Programming Code. BROADCASTING, Oct. 2, 1989, at 50. In the
absence of regulations or a voluntary program code, the
commercialization of children's programming increased
steadily over the next six years. H.R. REP. No. 101-385, at 7
(1989)'(citing to several studies, including the 1988 NAB Sur-
vey) [hereinafter House Report]; see also S. REP. No. 101-227, at
9-10 (1989) [hereinafter Senate Report). Consequently, Con-
gress stepped in and enacted statutory advertising time limits
for children's programming as part of the Children's Televi-
sion Act of 1990. House Report at 8; see also Senate Report at 10.
The statutory advertising limits are codified at 47 U.S.C.
§ 303a(b) (1994).
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more readily revisit the issue if the industry failed
to respond as expected.24
The Commission's decision in 1974 was unani-
mous. One Republican Commissioner called the
policy statement "a milestone in the Commis-
sion's history."2 5 Another, a Democrat, warned,
however, that "I would not have these efforts in-
terpreted as merely the first step in a continuous
series of measures by the FCC to act as a censor
for children's programming."2 6
ACT sought judicial review of the 1974 Chil-
dren's Television Report and Policy Statement,
complaining, inter alia, that the Commission
should have adopted more specific programming
rules, as ACT had urged in its initial petition. 27
The court, however, affirmed the Commission.2 8
Noting the First Amendment and policy problems
inherent in program content and advertising
practices regulation, the court found the Commis-
sion's reticence to adopt the rules urged on it by
ACT proper. "Heeding that counsel, the Commis-
sion has chosen to accord licensees a substantial
measure of their customary discretion in the areas
of programming . . . and yet it has made it quite
clear that general improvements must be forth-
coming .. . in increased educational and informa-
tive programming."2" Thus, the court resisted the
temptation to cast itself in the role of primus inter
pares in its "partnership" with the FCC and held
the Commission's action a "reasoned exercise of
its discretion."30
Within months, the issue, again, was joined at
the FCC. Blanket oppositions were filed against
the license renewal applications of television sta-
tions in Los Angeles and San Francisco in Novem-
ber 1979.31 The petitioners also requested that
the children's television proceeding be reacti-
vated.32 By January, NAB had responded with a
study, which, according to NAB, showed that sta-
24 1974 Children's Television Report and Policy Statement,
supra note 10, para. 58. The Chairman of the Commission
emphasized this in testifying to Congress nine months after
the policy statement was adopted. Broadcast Advertising and
Children: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Communications, of the
House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 94th Cong.
367 (1975) (statement of Richard E. Wiley, Chairman, FCC).
25 1974 Children's Television Report and Policy Statement,
supra note 10, at 36 (separate statement of Commissioner Ab-
bottWashburn).
26 Id. at 37 (separate statement of Commissioner Glen 0.
Robinson).
27 See generally Action for Children's Television v. FCC, 564
F.2d 458 (D.C. Cir. 1977) [hereinafter ACT I].
28 Id. at 459.
tions were providing children's programming of
"adequate diversity, educational and cultural con-
tent and scheduling on other than weekends to
satisfy" the Commission's policy.3 3 ACT re-
sponded with a Petition for an Inquiry and Notice
of Proposed Rulemaking.3 4 Therein, ACT dis-
puted NAB's conclusions and, again, urged the
Commission to adopt a better definition of chil-
dren's programming and rules specifying the
amount, nature, age-specificity, and scheduling of
children's programming.35
Meanwhile, the Democrats regained control of
the White House with the election in 1976 of Pres-
identJimmy Carter. President Carter appointed a
new FCC Chairman in the person of Charles D.
Ferris, a long-time prot~g6 of then Speaker of the
House "Tip" O'Neill. In 1978, only a year after
the ACT I decision, the new Chairman launched
an inquiry into children's television programming
and advertising practices.3 6  The Commission
pointed to its "long established intention to revisit
the issue of voluntary compliance with our chil-
dren's television programming and advertising
policies."3 7 In its Second NOI, the Commission
posed an extensive array of questions concerning
the overall amount of children's television pro-
gramming, the amount of educational and infor-
mational children's programming, age-specific
programming, program scheduling, and over-
commercialization of programs designed for chil-
dren.38  The Commission also re-established its
Children's Television Task Force which was di-
rected to evaluate the effectiveness of industry
self-regulation with respect to children's program-
ming and advertising. 9 For the first time, the
Commission also embraced the advent of new
video technologies, primarily cable television, and
directed the Task Force to "investigate the overall
effect of new technologies and alternative sources
29 Id. at 480.
30 Id. at 482.
31 See In re Children's Programming and Advertising
Practices, Second Notice of Inquiry, 68 F.C.C.2d 1344, para. 21
(1978) [hereinafter Second NOI].
32 Id.
3 Id. paras. 22-23.
34 Id. para. 25 (ACT petition filed Feb. 23, 1978).
ss Id. paras. 25-26.
36 Second NOI, supra note 31, at 1344.
37 Id. para. 19.
38 Id. paras. 37-45.
39 See In re Children's Television Programming and Ad-
vertising Practices, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 75 F.C.C.2d
138, para. 4 (1979) [hereinafter 1979 NPRM].
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of programming on the availability of children's
programming."4 0
The Task Force presented its report on Octo-
ber 30, 1979.4' The Task Force alleged that
broadcast stations had failed to comply with the
programming guidelines of the 1974 Children's
Television Report and Policy Statement and rec-
ommended that the Commission quantify its ex-
pectations of broadcasters. 42 According to the
Task Force, the average amount of time devoted
to educational children's programs had shown no
appreciable change since adoption of the 1974
Children's Television Report and Policy State-
ment.4 3  Network originated educational chil-
dren's programs amounted to 2.77 hours- per-
week per-station on average in 1973-74 and 2.76
hours-per-week per-station in 1977-78. In the
same time span, syndicated programming fell
from 1.42 to 1.14 hours-per-week per-station.44
Relying heavily on the Task Force's findings
and recommendations the Commission quickly is-
sued a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking. 45
Therein the Commission delineated five options
ranging from recision of the 1974 Children's Tel-
evision Report and Policy Statement to mandatory
program rules.4 6 Other options included a li-
cense renewal processing guideline and increas-
ing the number of non-broadcast video outlets. 4 7
The proposed rule would have required stations
to provide five hours per week of educational pro-
gramming for pre-school children (two to five
years of age) and an additional two-and-a-half
hours per week for school-age children (six to
twelve years of age) .48 The programming would
have had to be scheduled on Monday - Friday be-
tween 8 a.m. and 8 p.m.49 Commissioner Abbott
40 Id.
41 Id. para. 5.
42 Id. paras. 5-6.
43 Id. para. 16.
44 Id.
45 See generally id. at 138 ("initiating proceeding because
of our long standing concern for improved television service
for children.").
46 Id. paras. 30-46.
47 Id. paras. 40, 46.
48 Id. para. 35.
49 Id.
50 Id. at 156 (separate statement of Commissioner Abbott
Washburn, concurring in part and dissenting in part).
5i Id.
52 Id. at 155 (concurring statement of Commissioner
James H. Quello).
53 Id. at 153-54 (separate statement of Chairman Charles
Washburn dissented from the mandatory rule and
processing guideline options.50 He called the
Task Force Report "incomplete and mislead-
ing."51 Commissioner James H. Quello, later to
be a pivotal player in the 1996 deliberations,
called the issuance of a notice of proposed rule
making premature in light of the fact that the
Commission had issued its Notice after providing
interested parties "a mere 45 days in which to pro-
vide informal comments on the report."5 2 Even
Chairman Charles Ferris disclaimed any propen-
sity to adopt a quantitative standard:
I would only turn to the option of FCC imposition of a
requirement that each television station air a specific
amount of weekday programming for preschoolers and
school age children with very great reluctance. I would
do so only if I found after we received all comments
and studies submitted in this docket that every possible
alternative had to be discarded as inappropriate.5 3
Comments to the 1979 NPRM were filed in the
summer of 1980. In November, 1980, Ronald
Reagan was elected President. He appointed a
new FCC Chairman, Mark S. Fowler. The new
Chairman's attitude was illustrated by his remarks
following CBS's shift of Captain Kangaroo from
weekdays to weekends:
Frankly, I don't see how you could possibly mandate
more children's television. I believe commercial broad-
casters alone should decide what they shall broadcast,
because they have the Constitutional right of free
speech. It's too bad Captain Kangaroo is gone, but the
Government should not be issuing directives about
what should be on the air.5 4
Under the new administration, the children's
proceeding was relegated to the proverbial back
burner at the FCC. When nothing happened for
18 months, ACT, petitioned the U.S. District
Court in Washington to force the FCC to act.55
D. Ferris). Three years later, as a former chairman, Mr. Fer-
ris seemed more amenable to a mandated minimum amount
of educational programming for children. He was quoted in
the New York Times as stating, "We are well aware that it is not
in the economic interest of the broadcasters to aim this kind
of programming at an audience amounting to 16 to 18 per-
cent of the population - age 12 and younger - but if the
obligation falls evenly on all, then no one is particularly dis-
advantaged." Ernest Holsendolph, Are Children No Longer in
the Programming Picture?, N.Y. TIMES, July 25, 1982, § 2, at 21.
These two themes were to find new life with the Democrats'
return to the White House - and the Chairmanship of the
Commission - some 12 years later. See infra text accompany-
ing notes 100-8.
54 Holsendolph, supra note 53, at 21.
55 Action for Children's Television v. FCC, 546 F.Supp. 872
(D.D.C. 1982) (petition filed on May 18, 1982, 82-2438).
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The suit was dismissed on jurisdictional
grounds.5 6 ACT then asked the U.S. Court of Ap-
peals for the D.C. Circuit to review the FCC's fail-
ure to act.5 7 Responding to the court, Chairman
Fowler promised that the Commission would
complete action in the proceeding "by the end of
the 1983 calendar year."58
In March 1983, the Commission reopened the
children's television proceeding for the purpose
of updating the record.5 9 The Commission heard
oral presentations and entertained additional
written comments. Shortly, thereafter, the FCC
terminated the proceeding, stating that it found
"no basis in the record to apply a national
mandatory quota for children's programming."6 0
Instead, the Commission restated the "continuing
duty, under the public interest standard, on each
licensee to examine the program needs of the
child part of the audience and to be ready to
demonstrate at renewal time its attention to those
56 Id. at 56.
57 In re Petition of Action for Children's Television
(ACT) for Rule Making Looking Toward the Elimination of
Sponsorship and Commercial Content in Children's Pro-
gramming and the Establishment of a Weekly 14 Hour Quota
of Children's Television Programs, RM 1569, Dkt. No. 19142
(Dec. 8, 1982) [hereinafter 1982 ACT Petition].
. 5S NATIONAL AsSOCIATION OF BROADCASTERS, BROADCAST-
ING AND GOVERNMENT: AN UPDATE AND HISTORIcA. PERSPEC-
TIVE 109 (1985).
59 In re Petition of Action for Children's Television
(ACT) for Rule Making Looking Toward the Elimination of
Sponsorship and Commercial Content in Children's Pro-
gramming and the Establishment of a Weekly 14 Hour Quota
of Children's Television Programs (Dkt. No. 19142), Public
Notice, Mar. 28, 1983 (announcing Oral Presentations sched-
uled for Apr. 28, 1983).
60 See 1984 Programming Report and Order, supra note 13,
para. 46.
61 Id.
62 Id. para. 32. The Commission stated:
In sum, we can not conclude that statistical studies of the
Task Force or of the other commenting parties in them-
selves make out a case for increased regulatory concern
or involvement. Properly viewed, the adequacy [sic] of
the programming to which children have access must be
based on a consideration of the whole of the video distri-
bution system. Viewing that system broadly and on an
overall national basis, we find increases in the children's
programming available from the average station, dra-
matic increases in the number of stations in operation,
increases in the availability of these stations through
cable carriage and improved station facilities, increased
availability of noncommercial programming made possi-
ble through the growth of the public broadcasting sys-
tem, and increased viewing options provided to substan-
. tial portions of the population by the operation of cable
television systems. In short, there is no national failure
of access to children's programming that requires an
across-the-board, national quota for each and every li-
needs."6' The basic rationale of the Commis-
sion's decision was its conclusion that the market-
place had not failed to provide an adequate
supply of educational and informational program-
ming for children. 6 2 The Commission also relied
on the oft-stated constitutional and policy objec-
tions to a quantitative requirement.63
In a brief per curium decision the D.C. Circuit
affirmed the Commission's 1984 Report and Or-
der.6 4 The court held that the Commission prop-
erly had considered children's programming
available on cable television and noncommercial
broadcast stations in determining that no uni-
form, nationwide rule was necessary.65 The court
also dismissed ACT's concerns that the 1984 Re-
port and Order relieved licensees of the obliga-
tion to provide programming for different age
groups.66 Ultimately, the court the called the
1984 Report and Order, "a far cry from the whole-
sale abolition of licensee responsibility perceived
censee to meet.
Id.
63 Id. para. 43.
We thus find ourselves precisely caught between the ap-
parent possibility of accomplishing an extremely impor-
tant and socially desirable objective and the legislative
and Constitutional mandate and the values on which
they are based which forbid our direct involvement in
program censorship and which require that broadcast
station licensees retain broad discretion in the program-
ming they broadcast. Recognizing that a balance must
be reached, we believe this balance is best struck
through a continued stress on the general licensee obli-
gations emphasized by the Commission in its 1974 Chil-
dren's Television Policy Statement and through the gen-
eral requirement that stations provide programming
responsive to the needs and interests of the communities
they serve.
Id.; but see id. at 662-63 (dissenting statement of Commis-
sioner Henry M. Rivera).
64 Action for Children's Television v. FCC, 756 F.2d 899
(D.C. Cir. 1985) (ACT II). Of historical interest, perhaps,
two of the three judges that heard the case later were to be
named to the Supreme Court of the United States, Judges
Antonin Scalia and Ruth Bader Ginsburg. Judge Ginsburg,
however, took no part in the decision. Id. at 900. Judge
Skelly Wright completed the panel. Id.
65 Id. at 901.
66 Id. at 902.
It is absurd to believe that "the programh needs of the
child part of the audience" were thought to be uniform,
from pre-school through elementary school. It seems
clear to us that under the 1984 Order broadcasters faced
with renewal challenges based on the adequacy of their
children's programming can be called upon to explain
why they chose to focus on the needs and interests of
certain age groups or other segments of the child audi-
ence, or why they emphasized emotional rather than
cognitive needs.
Id.
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by [ACT] ."
Whereas the matter then appeared dead letter
at the FCC, children's television issues began to
draw Congressional interest.68 Within months of
the court's decision, bills directing the FCC to
adopt quantitative guidelines to assess licensee
performance had been introduced in both
houses.69 The bills went nowhere. In 1987, Sena-
tor Lautenberg and, by then, Senator Wirth again
introduced legislation seeking imposition of
quantitative guidelines.7 0 The 100th Congress ul-
timately did pass the Children's Television Act of
1988.7' That bill, however, contained no quanti-
tative standard. That provision had been jet-
tisoned in order to eliminate broadcast industry
opposition to the bill.7 2 Although the House had
voted 328 to 78 to pass the bill and the Senate had
passed it on a unrecorded voice vote that could
have been stopped by opposition from a single
senator, President Reagan exercised a "pocket
veto" of the bill by not signing within ten days dur-
ing a Congressional recess.73
The process began again in the 101st Congress
with the introduction of H.R. 1677, the Children's
Television Act of 1989, by Rep. John Bryant (D-
TX).74 Eighteen months later H.R.1677 was
passed by Congress.7 5 Again, NAB and broadcast
interests supported the legislation only after it was
revised to include less specific programming obli-
67 Id. at 902.
68 After the court decision, ACT turned its attention to
Congress. Penny Pagano, Activists of Kid-TV Turn to Congress,
LA. TIMES, Mar. 21, 1985, Part VI at 1.
69 The "Children's Television Education Act of 1985,"
was introduced by Senator Frank Lautenberg (D-N.J.). S.
1594, 99th Cong. (1985). Notable in retrospect among the
co-sponsors was then Senator Albert Gore, Jr. (D-Tenn.). 131
CONG. REc. S10914 (daily ed. Aug. 1, 1985) (statement of
Sen. Lautenberg). In the House, Telecommunications Sub-
committee Chair Tim Wirth (D-Colo.) introduced compan-
ion legislation. H.R. 3216, 99th Cong. (1985), 131 Cong. Rec.
H22684 (daily ed. Aug. 1, 1985); see also Children's TV. Another
Bill From Wirth, BROADCASTING, Aug. 5, 1985, at 28.
70 133 CONG. REC. S10213 (daily ed.July 17, 1987) (state-
ment of Sen. Lautenberg for himself and Sen. Wirth, intro-
ducing S. 1505, 100th Cong. (1987)).
7' H.R. REP. No. 101-385 at 12 (1989).
72 Kari Granville, Regulating Children's TV, NEWSDAY, June
26, 1988, at 80.
73 Irwin Motolotsky, Reagan Vetoes Bill Putting Limits On
TV Programming for Children, N.Y TIMES, Nov. 7, 1988, at Al.
74 135 CONG. Rhc. H959 (daily ed. Apr. 5, 1989).
75 136 CONG. REc. S13643 (daily ed. Sept. 24, 1990); 136
CONG. REc. H8536 (daily ed. Oct. 1, 1990).
76 Senate Kidvid Bill Limits Ads, BROADCASTING, July 16,
1990, at 32; see also Edmund L. Andrews, F.CC. Adopts Limits
on TVAds Aimed at Children, N. Y. TIMES, Apr. 10, 1991, at D7.
gations. 76 On October 18, 1990, the bill became
the Children's Television Act of 1990, Public Law
No. 101-437, without President Bush's signature.77
The Act requires the FCC to consider, in its re-
view of a local television station's application for
the renewal of its license, the extent to which the
licensee "served the educational and informa-
tional need of children through the licensee's
overall programming, including programming
specifically designed to serve such needs."7  The
Act also permits the FCC to consider "any special
non-broadcast efforts by the licensee which en-
hance the educational and informational value of
such programming," as well as "any special efforts
by the licensee to produce or support program-
ming broadcast by another station in the licen-
see's marketplace which is specifically designed to
serve the educational and informational needs of
children."7 9 No quantitative requirement or
guideline was included. In fact the legislative his-
tory of the Act, according to the FCC in 1990, ex-
pressly rejected quantitative standards.80
The Commission's 1990 NPRM proposing rules
to implement the new law added no gloss to the
basic requirements stated in the Act. The Com-
mission simply acknowledged that Congress had
intended to "afford licensees maximum discre-
tion" in fulfilling the programming require-
ment."' Consistent with its proposals, the Com-
77 Bill Curtailing Kids' TV Ads Becomes Law, CHI. TRun.,
Oct. 18, 1990, at 2.
78 47 U.S.C. § 303b(a) (2) (1994). Congress also directed
the FCC to adopt rules limiting the number of minutes of
commercial matter that television stations may air during
children's programming and to consider in its review of tele-
vision license renewals the extent to which the licensee has
complies with such commercial limits. 47 U.S.C. § 303a(b)
(1994). Effective January 1, 1992, commercial material aired
within children's programming was limited to 10.5 minutes
per hour on weekends and 12 minutes per hour on week-
days. In Re Policies and Rules Concerning Children's Televi-
sion Programming and Revision of Programming and Com-
mercialization Policies, Ascertainment Requirements, and
Program Log Requirements, Report and Order, 6 FCC Rcd
2111, para. 24 (1991) [hereinafter 1991 Report and Order].
Enforcement of the commercial limitations portions of the
Act has been taken very seriously by the Commission and has
produced forfeitures up to $125,000. Letter from FCC to
Clear Channel Television, Inc. Licensee, KTTU (TV), 10 FCC
Rcd 3773 (1995) (assessing a notice of apparent liability for a
forfeiture for willful and repeated violations).
79 47 U.S.C. § 303b(b) (1994).
80 In re Policies and Rules Concerning Children's Televi-
sion Programming, Noiice of Proposed Rule Making, 5 FCC Rcd
7199, para. 8 n.28 (1990) [hereinafter 1990 NPRM].
81 Id.
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mission adopted no quantitative standard in its
initial rules implementing the Act. The Commis-
sion was emphatic:
The Act imposes no quantitative standards and the leg-
islative history suggests that Congress meant that no
minimum amount criterion be imposed. Given this
strong legislative direction, and the latitude afforded
broadcasters in fulfilling the program requirement, we
believe that the amount of "specifically designed" pro-
gramming necessary to comply with the Act's require-
ment is likely to vary according to other circumstances,
including but not limited to, type of programming
aired and other nonbroadcast efforts made by the sta-
tion. We thus decline to establish any minimum pro-
gramming requirement for licensees for renewal review
independent of that established in the Act.82
The Commission, however, did clarify that
short-segment programming might qualify as
"specifically designed" educational and informa-
tional programming for children.8 3 In addition,
the Commission adopted a definition of educa-
tional and informational programming, noting
that they "cannot properly apply or enforce the
Act, and licensees cannot properly implement it,
without some delineation of the boundaries of the
programming requirement." 4 The Commission
relied on a statement by Senator Inouye (D-
Haw.), who defined such programming broadly,
as any programming which furthered a "child's in-
tellectual, emotional, and social development."8 5
No one sought judicial review of the Commis-
sion's 1991 Report and Order.
II. THE 1996 DECISION
A. The Political Landscape
For the first time in twelve years, the American
82 1991 Report and Order, supra note 78, para. 24.
83 Id. para. 25.
84 Id. para. 20.
85 Id. para. 19. The definition adopted by the Commis-
sion defined educational and informational programming
for children as "any television programming which furthers
the positive development of children 16-years-of-age and
under in any respect, including the child's intellectual/cog-
nitive or social/emotional needs." 47 C.F.R. § 73.671 Note
(1996).
86 President William Jefferson Clinton first named FCC
Commissioner Jim Quello as Chairman on an interim basis.
See Cindy Skrzycki, D.C. Lawyer Chosen To Be FCC Chairman,
WASH. POST, June 30, 1993, at Fl. In 1993, however, he
named Reed Hundt as Chairman, although Commissioner
Quello remained on the Commission. Id.
87 In re Policies and Rules Concerning Children's Televi-
sion Programming, Notice of Inquiry, 8 FCC Rcd 1841, para. 1
(1993) [hereinafter 1993 NOI]. As was subsequently re-
ported, "[c]riticism from Capitol Hill and public interest
public elected a Democrat president in Novem-
ber, 1992.86 The Democrats controlled the Sen-
ate and House, as well.
1. Congressional Pressure
By March 1993, the Commission, and key Dem-
ocrats in Congress, were noisily unsheathing, if
not outright rattling their sabers over broadcast-
ers' record of compliance with the Act. In fact,
the race was on to see who could lead the charge.
After the House Subcommittee on Telecommuni-
cations and Finance announced hearings to chide
the Commission for inaction since 1991, the Com-
mission, on March 2, 1993, issued a Notice of In-
quiry to examine how its "rules and policies might
be revised to more clearly identify the levels and
types of programming necessary in the long term
to adequately serve the educational and informa-
tional needs of children."8 7 At hearings focusing
specifically on broadcaster compliance with the
Act, Chairman Edward Markey (D-Mass.) of the
House Subcommittee of Telecommunications
and Finance, warned that the change of adminis-
tration meant "[t]he new era has begun.""
Indeed, it had. Chairman Markey never let up.
He conducted extensive hearings in both 1993
and 1994.89 He endorsed a requirement that
broadcasters air a certain amount of educational
programming for children, complaining that
"children's programming remains the equivalent
of a trip to Toys 'R Us . . . [and that] the existing
rules have not resulted in the increase in chil-
dren's educational programming that Congress
envisioned when passing the act."90 Even after
groups forced the [FCC] . . . to ask for comments on how it
might clarify the rules." Kim McAvoy, Kids TV Stays on FCC
Seesaw, BROADCASTING & CABLE, July 4, 1994, at 32.
88 Christy Fisher, Broadcast Regulators Turn Up the Heat,
ADVERTISINc AGE, Mar. 15, 1993, at 52. As ACT founder
Peggy Charren was to point out after the Commission
adopted its new rules in August 1996, "[M]y sense is that I
won - I didn't know this at the time, quite - the day Bill
Clinton became President." Harry A. Jessell, Peggy Charren:
Victory At Long Last, BROADCASTING & CABLE, Aug. 12, 1996, at
20.
89 Children's Television: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Tele-
communications and Finance of the House Comm. On Energy and
Commerce, 103d Cong. (1993); Children's Television (Part 2):
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Telecommunications and Finance
of the House Comm. On Energy and Commerce, 103d Cong.
(1994).
90 Broadcasters and America's Children, BROADCASTING &
CABIE, July 25, 1994, at 77.
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the Republicans gained control of the Congress in
the 1994 elections, now Congressman Markey, as
ranking minority member of the Subcommittee,
stayed on the soap box, calling children's televi-
sion "the video equivalent of Twinkies: Kids like it,
but it lacks any intellectual nutritional benefit."91
Congressman Markey was not alone. Earlier, in
March 1993, Senator Paul Simon (D-Ill.) had
pointed to recent interpretations of the Act by
broadcasters which he characterized as comical. 2
As the FCC's proceedings moved forward, Con-
gressional concern over all aspects of television re-
lated to children grew significantly. For example,
in early 1995, several bills were introduced by
Congress that addressed violence on television
and its effect on children.' In October 1995
Congressman Markey was joined at his "Twinkie"
press conference by Senator Diane Feinstein (D-
Cal.).94
When 1996 began with no resolution of the
FCC's rule making, Congressman Markey called
again for the FCC to adopt a three-hour mini-
mum, complaining that television stations had
substituted The Flintstones and The Jetsons for
truly educational children's programming.95 Ac-
cording to the Congressman, the stations were
claiming that those programs taught children
about the "archaeological age" and "the future,"
respectively.96 He called on all Members of the
House to support his position to "advance th [e]
91 Djamila Salem, Lawmakers Push New Rules for Children's
TV, LA. TIMES, Oct. 12, 1995, at A14.
92 139 CONG. REc. S2973 (daily ed. Mar. 16, 1993) (state-
ment of Sen. Simon, offering as an example "[s]tations claim-
ing that The Jetsons is educational because it teaches young-
sters about space technology").
93 See, e.g., 141 CONG. REc. S3052 (daily ed. Feb. 23,
1995) (statement of Sen. Hollings introducing S. 470, the
"Children's Protection from Violent Programming Act of
1995"); see also 141 CONG. REc. H4177 (daily ed. Apr. 4, 1995)
(statement of Rep. Jacobs introducing H.R 1390, the "Chil-
dren's Media Protection Act of 1995"). Many of the bills
were previously introduced in the 103d Congress, but re-
ceived increased publicity in the wake of the Commission's
public debate and the shadows of an upcoming presidential
election year. These bills were a precursor to the "Parental
Choice in Television Programming Act" which was ultimately
incorporated into the Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub.
L. No. 104-104, § 551, 110 Stat. 56 (codified at 47 U.S.C.
§ 551). In what was supposedly a deregulatory piece of legis-
lation, this provision of the 1996 Act raised the level of gov-
ernment control of broadcast content.
94 Salem, supra note 91.
95 142 CONG. REc. H3208-3209 (daily ed. Mar. 29, 1996)
(statement of Rep. Markey).
916 Id. Broadcasters vigorously disputed the notion that
such practices were widespread. See e.g., Comments of Associ-
children's television agenda at the [FCC]."9 7
Three days after his floor speech, Congressman
Markey and 103 of his colleagues in the House
sent a letter to the four sitting FCC Commission-
ers urging them "to defend the rights of children
... and to reject arguments against setting a clear,
unambiguous 3-hour threshold for all broadcast-
ers to meet in return for renewal of a license to
use the public airwaves."98 Notably, the letter was
signed by Republicans, as well as Democrats, and
if any Republicans disagreed, their dissents were
inaudible.99
2. Interest from the White House
A new administration also brought an entirely
new view on the issue. In September 1995, Presi-
dent Clinton wrote to FCC Chairman Reed Hundt
urging adoption of a three hour minimum. 00
The President stated that "the dissemination of
true educational programming across the public
airwaves is a priceless gift to our children."o'0 The
next day, Larry Irving, the Assistant Secretary for
Communications and Information, U.S. Depart-
ment of Commerce, also wrote Chairman Hundt
urging him "to establish clear guidelines requir-
ing broadcasters to air at least three hours, and
preferably more, of children's educational pro-
gramming each week during hours when children
are in the audience." 0 2 In April 1996, the De-
ation of Independent Television Stations, Inc. (INTV), to the
Notice of Proposed Rule Making in MM Dkt. No. 93-48, at 13
(Oct. 16, 1995) [hereinafter INTV Comments].
97 142 CONG. REc. H3209 (daily ed. Mar. 29, 1996)
(statement of Rep. Markey).
98 Letter from EdwardJ. Markey, Congressman (D-Mass)
to the Honorable Reed Hundt, Chairman, Federal Commu-
nications Commission and the Honorable James Quello, Su-
san Ness and Rachelle Chong, Commissioners, Federal Com-
munications Commission (Apr. 2, 1996) (on file with
CommLaw Conspectus).
99 Indeed, the target of the letter from Congressman
Markey and his colleagues would appear to have been Com-
missioner Rachelle Chong, a Republican, who only days
before had opposed a three-hour standard publicly for the
first time. Lawrie Mifflin, FCC. Urged to Strengthen Children's
TV, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 2, 1996, at A16.
100 Letter from Bill Clinton, President of the United
States, to the Honorable Reed E. Hundt, Chairman, Federal
Communications Commission (Sept. 18, 1995) (as appended
to Reply Comments of NTIA, to the Notice ofProposed Rulemak-
ing in MM Dkt. No. 93-48 (Apr. 18, 1996) [hereinafter NTIA
Reply Comments].
101 Id.
102 Letter from Larry Irving, Assistant Secretary for Com-
munications and Information to the Honorable Reed E.
Hundt, Chairman, Federal Communications Commission 2
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partment's National Telecommunication and In-
formation Administration ("NTIA"), headed by
Assistant Secretary Irving, filed formal Reply Com-
ments in the FCC's rule making proceeding
which reiterated the administration's position.10 3
Vice President Albert Gore also joined in the
administration chorus. Addressing the National
Association of Broadcasters' convention in April,
1996, the Vice President reemphasized the admin-
istration's position favoring a three hour require-
ment. 0 4 He repeated the theme in a speech at
the National Cable Television Association conven-
tion two weeks later. 10 He also took the opportu-
nity to politicize the issue further by castigating
Republicans for their purported lack of con-
cern. 06
At the Democratic National Convention in Au-
gust 1996, only a few weeks after the FCC adopted
the new three hour processing guideline, the
President touted the new rule as one of his admin-
istration's accomplishments, stating that "three
hours of quality children's programming every
week on every network are on the way." 0 7 Vice
President Gore echoed that theme, emphasizing
that "[w]hen our children turn on the TV, let
them learn how to read and add and spell and
think, not how to kill."1o8
B. The FCC Deliberations
In this context of consistent pressure from the
White House and Congress to adopt a three hour
minimum requirement, one might have taken for
granted a quick, clean decision by the FCC to
adopt such a rule. After all, the Chairman was a
Clinton appointee, one of three Democrats along
with Commissioners Jim Quello and Susan Ness.
(Sept. 19, 1995) (as appended to NTIA Reply Comments, supra
note 100).
103 NTIA Reply Comments, at i.
104 Harry A. Jessell, Gore Calls for Kids Quotas, BROADCAST-
INC & CABLE, Apr. 17, 1996, at 4.
105 Gore, at NCTA, Challenges Republicans on Kid TV, COM-
MUNICATIONs DAILY, Apr. 30, 1996, at 1.
106 Id. Later, the President and the Vice President were
to play pivotal roles in the FCC's adoption of the new rules
establishing the three hour processing guidelines.
107 Heather Fleming, TV Gored in Chicago, BROADCASTING
& CABLE, Sept. 2, 1996, at 6.
108 Id.
109 Indeed, Commissioner Barrett, who remained on the
Commission past his term, resigned before the issue came to
a head in mid-1996. Mike Mills, Barrett to Exit FCC by May 1,
WASH. POST, Mar. 13, 1996, at C3.
Of the two remaining Commissioners, both Re-
publican, one, Andrew Barrett, was expected to
leave after his term expired in June 1995 and the
other, Rachelle Chong, was uncommitted.109
Even before the new chairman had been ap-
pointed, Chairman Jim Quello had moved quickly
to initiate the 1993 inquiry into the efficacy of the
new law and the FCC's rules. 110 He later observed
prior to the FCC's en banc hearings on the issue in
June 1994 that "something has to be done; Con-
gress is insisting on it."' 11
After the 1994 hearings, however, the polariza-
tion of the issue began. Commissioners Quello
and Barrett stated their opposition to more spe-
cific, quantitative requirements. 12 Commissioner
Ness declared children's television her top prior-
ity, stating that "[n]o one is keen about regulation
for regulation's sake. But we are keen about hav-
ing the intent of the Children's TV Act real-
ized."' '3
The issue became formally polarized in April
1995, when the FCC released another Notice of Pro-
posed Rule Making."4 Among the Commission's
proposals, three focused on the amount of chil-
dren's educational programming. The first pro-
vided for Commission monitoring of program-
ming broadcast in the wake of new measures
adopted to improve the flow of information to the
public and tightening the definition of program-
ming specifically designed to serve the educa-
tional needs of children. 1"5 The second was a
"safe harbor processing guideline" which estab-
lished an amount of educational and informa-
tional programming which would be sufficient to
demonstrate compliance with the Act. 1 6 The
third was an outright requirement that stations
broadcast a set minimum amount of such pro-
1o See 1993 NOI, supra note 87.
iI Commissioners Prepare for Children's Hour, BROADCAST-
INC & CABLE, June 27, 1994, at 10. Commissioner Chong also
seemed far from closed to the idea of quantitative guidelines,
although she clearly appeared reluctant to regulate unless
"the amount of children's programming hasn't improved sig-
nificantly." Id.
112 Jenny Hontz, Barrett, Quello Oppose New Kids TV Regu-
lation, ELECTRONIC MEDIA, July 4, 1994, at 3.
1 13 Kim McAvoy, Commissioner Looks Out For Kids, BROAD-
CASTING & CABLE, July 25, 1994, at 67.
114 In re Policies and Rules Concerning Children's Tele-
vision Programming, Notice of Proposed Rule Making, 10 FCC
Rcd 6308 (1995) [hereinafter 1995 NPRM].
115 Id. paras. 24-26, 36-44.
116 Id. para. 56.
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gramming.1 7
ByJuly 1995, the positions of the Chairman and
the four sitting Commissioners had taken shape.
Chairman Hundt favored the third option - a
mandatory three-hour rule.'"" He was convinced
that stations lacked the economic incentive in a
competitive marketplace to broadcast children's
educational programming. 119 Commissioner
Ness advocated a three hour safe harbor, but
would have left some flexibility for stations to
demonstrate compliance with the Act in other
ways.' 2 0  Commissioner Chong's position
emerged clearly in opposition to a "blanket quan-
titative guideline."' 2 ' She saw no case for the
proposition that children educational program-
ming had decreased and, therefore, posited that
the rules would fail to pass constitutional mus-
ter."12 2 Commissioners Quello and Barrett con-
curred with Commissioner Chong in their opposi-
tion of quantification.123
The debate became more personal and antago-
nistic in September 1995. Westinghouse Electric
Corporation, in its application for Commission
consent to its acquisition of CBS, Inc., voluntarily
committed to double its children's educational
programming to two hours of educational pro-
gramming per week on the network, and increase
it to three hours per week by 1997.124 As a result
of the Westinghouse commitment, a petition to
deny the application was withdrawn.' 2 5 Commis-
sioner Quello accused Chairman Hundt of ex-
tracting the commitment from Westinghouse:
Any such agreement, particularly extracted after signifi-
117 Id. para. 59.
118 Christopher Stern, FCCs Hundt Takes Children's Televi-
sion Under His Wing, BROADCASTING & CABLE, July 24, 1995, at
61.
1 9 Id. According to the Chairman, stations fear to
devote resources to children's programming when their com-
petitors are not required to do so therefore, a rule would
place all stations on equal footing and remove that disincen-
tive. Id.
120 Id.
121 Id.
122 Id.
123 See id. ("Other FCC commissioners have raised First
Amendment concerns about requiring broadcasters to air a
minimum amount of educational programming. Not one of
the four other commissioners has embraced Hundt's propo-
sal ..... ).
124 In Re Applications of Stockholders of CBS Inc. and
Westinghouse Electric Corporation for Transfer of Control
of CBS, Inc. Licensee of WCBS-TV, Memorandum Opinion and
Order, 11 FCC Rcd 3733, para. 13 (1995); see also Paul Farhl,
Westinghouse to Air More Kid's Shows, WASH. PosT, Sept. 21,
1995, at D12. At the same time, Westinghouse Chairman
cant pressure has been exerted by the head of a govern-
mental agency through speeches and meetings, and in
the context of a petition to deny from a public interest
group that could have delayed the sale of the station, is
an affront to the First Amendment and is unlikely to
withstand court challenge.126
In a speech the same day, the Chairman told
his audience that "there is ample Commission
precedent for [Commissioner Quello] to consult"
in reference to Commissioner Quello's statement
that he would "'consider long and hard' any
transaction that includes an agreement relating to
the content of a broadcaster's programming."' 2 7
The Chairman also reminded Commissioner
Quello that when he, Quello, was Chairman, the
Commission approved an ownership transfer rely-
ing on Pulitzer Broadcasting Company's "repre-
sentation that it would 'enhance the station's pro-
gramming for children' by producing and airing
an informational show targeted to children ages
11 to 15 and hosted by teenagers."' 2 3 The Chair-
man, after disclaiming any prejudgment of the
Westinghouse application, remarked:
If the public interest is served by the concrete, quantifi-
able promise of one broadcaster to provide educational
programming for children, then surely it is served by
having a clear rule applicable to all broadcasters. In-
deed, without such a rule it is hard to see how one
broadcaster standing alone, can keep its promise. The
vigorous competition that characterizes the broadcast-
ing industry will drive even the best intentioned broad-
caster to the lowest level, as it does now.' 29
In response, Commissioner Quello called the
Chairman's claim of such a marketplace failure in
children's programming "a farcical notion in to-
Michael Jordan restates his company's opposition to a
mandatory standard. Id.
125 Letter from Henry Geller, Counsel for Petitioners
United Church of Christ, to William F. Caton, Acting Secre-
tary, FCC (Sept. 20, 1995) (on file with CommLaw Conspec-
tus).
126 Commissioner James H. Quello, Enough Already!,
Remarks Before the National Association of Broadcasters
Children's Television Symposium 8 (Sept. 21, 1995) [herein-
after Quello NAB Remarks]. "The Chairman has embarked on
an unprecedented, unrelenting public relations campaign to
urge support for his specific quantitative programming re-
quirements - which are constitutionally suspect." Id. at 3.
127 Chairman Reed E. Hundt, A New Paradigm for
Broadcast Regulation, Remarks Before the Conference for
the Second Century of the University of Pittsburgh School of
Law 5 (Sept. 21, 1995) [hereinafter Hundt Univ. of Pittsburgh
Remarks].
128 Id. at 6 (referring to In re Application of H & C Com-
munications, Inc. and KCCI Television, Inc., Memorandum
Opinion and Order, 9 FCC Rcd 144, para. 13 (1993)).
129 Id. at 6.
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day's multi-channel, multi-faceted era and repre-
sents only the viewer's failure to locate the desired
programs."13 0 Ultimately, Commissioner Quello
posited, "an objective review of the complete rec-
ord will indicate that broadcasters are already do-
ing an extensive job of airing educational and in-
formational programming for children."' 3 '
In October 1995, Commissioner Quello vented
his resentment of the implication that he was
against children. "I resent the implication that
FCC Commissioners are 'against children' unless
they support imposition of a 3 to 5 hour quantita-
tive standard, particularly when there has been a
significant increase in children's programming
over the past four years."' 3 2 The same day, Chair-
man Hundt stated that, "[A] reasonable amount
of educational television ought to be something
that every parent and every child can get free over
the air every day."' 3 3
Commissioner Quello also complained that the
Administration, in a call from Greg Simon, Spe-
cial Assistant to the Vice President for telecommu-
nications policy, urged him to support not only
the Westinghouse commitment, but also the im-
position of a three-hour requirement on all sta-
tions.' 4 Vice President Gore's office denied the
allegation but did acknowledge that Simon had
called Commissioner Quello to alert Quello of the
President's letter endorsing the three-hour
rule. '3
The verbal jousts acknowledged the political
nature of the debate. The Chairman, for exam-
ple, readily embraced that the FCC's indepen-
dence ignored practical - and political - reality.
"First, we depend on Congress for our annual
funding . ... Second, the President appoints me
and my four fellow Commissioners, subject to ap-
proval by the Senate .... So even though I'm not
part of the Executive Branch, I am certainly part
of the Administration's communications policy
structure." '365
1s0 Quello NAB Remarks, supra note 126, at 4.
IS Id. at 1.
132 Commissioner James H. Quello, Remarks Before the
Midwest Chapter of the Federal Communications Bar Associ-
ation 3 (Oct. 19, 1995) [hereinafter Quello FCBA Remarks].
133 Chairman Reed Hundt, Remarks Before the George
Washington University Telecommunications Seminar 4 (Oct.
19, 1995).
'34 Quello Says Administration Solicited His Vote on Children's
TV. COMMUNICATIONs DAILY, Sept. 27, 1995, at 2. The allega-
tion was made in Commissioner Quello's letter responding
to an inquiry from Senate Commerce Committee Chairman
Commissioner Quello also showed some sensi-
tivity to the fact that he was a Democrat standing
in opposition to a Democratic chairman and ad-
ministration. "In my 20+ years tenure at the Com-
mission, I have adhered to the principle that I
don't decide important controversial issues on the
basis of whether I am a Democratic or Republican
appointee."' 3 7 With a bit more bite, he added, "I
don't believe I have to disenfranchise myself as a
Commission Democrat, particularly a middle of
the road or conservative Democrat, by opposing
politically liberal, outdated regulations in the
competitive multichannel communications mar-
ket of today."' 3
Late in October 1995, Commissioner Chong
entered the fray complaining initially that the
"very public and quite heated" debate had fo-
cused too much on the issue of quantitative guide-
lines."13  Not that she was mute on the subject:
On this issue, I will make two points. First, I note that
the legislative history clearly indicates that Congress
considered and declined to adopt a quantitative ap-
proach and instead, left it up to the broadcasters to vol-
untarily meet their children's educational television
commitment.
Second, studies in our children's proceeding show an
increase has indeed occurred from the time the Act
passed. How much of an increase is being debated in
our record as various parties proffer studies, but
roughly, the studies show that such programs increased
from one hour a week to about three hours a week on
average.140
Commissioner Chong also encouraged com-
menters to address the Commission's proposed
definition of educational and informational pro-
grams, as well as "ways to improve the dialogue
between broadcasters and their communities."' 4 '
Meanwhile, not even the first government shut-
down in November 1995, could muzzle the de-
bate. At a news conference concerning the shut-
down, the Chairman could not resist the
opportunity to urge adoption of a quantitative re-
quirement, while Commissioner Quello opined
Larry Pressler concerning the Westinghouse commitment.
Id.
135 Fields Threatens "War" Over Social Contracts for Broad-
casters, COMMUNICATIONs DmLY, Sept. 28, 1995, at 1.
136 Hundt Munich Conference Remarks, supra note 1, at 1.
'37 Quello FCBA Remarks, supra note 132, at 7.
138 Id. at 5.
139 Commissioner Rachelle Chong, Remarks Before the
Women in Cable and Telecommunications Political Advo-
cacy Conference 6 (Oct. 30, 1995).
140 Id. at 7.
141 Id. at 5.
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that repeal of the Children's Television Act would
be a good idea.14 2
The issue retreated from the front pages of the
press later in the year as the FCC received and di-
gested comments filed in response to the Com-
mission's 1995 NPRM. With no clear majority in
his corner, the chairman understandably was in
no hurry to bring the matter up for a vote. Thus,
1995 ended on a quiet note, which carried over
into early 1996.'14
At the end of March 1996, Commissioner Bar-
rett resigned and left the Commission, leaving in
his wake an apparent two-two deadlock on the is-
sue of a quantitative standard - and the name
calling continued.14 4 When Commissioner
Quello, in a speech before the NAB's Children's
Television Symposium, pointed to the variety of
media providing children's programming (includ-
ing VCRs) ,4 supporters of quantification labeled
it the "'Let them eat VCR's' [sic] approach."14 6
Commissioner Quello called the Marie Antoinette
analogy "a cheap shot."' 4 7 Commissioner Chong
expressed her displeasure that no progress had
been made, and stated that she had offered many
compromise alternatives with no result. She re-
marked that "[i] t almost makes you wonder if this
is politics or if they really want to do something
for kids."' 4 8
The end of May 1996, saw the first appearance
of a break in the impasse. Commissioner Quello
signaled some flexibility on the quantification is-
sue, stating a desire to end the "internecine war"
that had torn the Commission. 4 9 He proposed
142 Kid TV Debate Continues Despite Government Shutdown,
COMMUNICATIONs DAILY, Nov. 15, 1995, at 3-4. Commissioner
Quello's remark drew a tart response from Jeffrey Chester,
Executive Director of the Center for Media Education, who
said that it "illustrates once again thatJim Quello is the offi-
cial representative of the NAB at the FCC ..... Id.
143 The second federal government shutdown which be-
gan on December 16, 1995, and extended for a record 21
days also may have contributed to the quiet. See, e.g., David
Espo, Impasse Forces 2nd Shutdown, Chi. Sun-Times, Dec.
16, 1995 at 3; see also Edward Walsh, An Avalanche of Work
Meets Returning Federal Workers, WASH. PosT, Jan. 9, 1996,
at A9.
144 Notably, Commissioner Quello's term was set to ex-
pire on June 30, 1996.
"45 Quello NAB Remarks, supra note 126, at 6-7.
146 Lawrie Mifflin, FC.C. Officials Reconcile on Children's
Programs, N.Y. TIMES, May 29, 1996, at C16.
147 Id.
148 Chong Seeks Commission Level-Meeting on Kidvid Rules,
COMMUNICATIONs DAILY, May 21 1996, at 2.
149 Quello Endorses Quantitative Kidvid Standards Based On
Industry Figures, COMMUNICATIONs DAILY, May 29, 1996, at 2.
requiring that stations meet a quantification stan-
dard "based on industry norms."150 His proposal
paralleled Commissioner Ness's proposal for a
processing guideline, but stopped short of a fixed
quantitative measure. The Chairman was happy
and called Commissioner Quello's proposal "an
invitation for a conversation."' 5  The conversa-
tion, however, still was to have its contentious mo-
ments.
Nonetheless, the discussions began in earnest
and within several weeks, both Commissioners
Quello and Chong had indicated their support
for a three-hour processing guideline.' 5 2 In the
interim, the President had reiterated his support
for a three-hour rule and set an industry summit
at the White House on children's television pro-
gramming before the end of July.'5  Congress-
man Markey also by then had corralled 220 mem-
bers of Congress in support of his quest for
quantification at the FCC.15 4 However, Commis-
sioners Quello and Chong still insisted that the
processing guideline retain sufficient flexibility to
allow stations to show compliance with the Act
even if they fell short of the three-hour thresh-
old. 15
If peace had broken out in June, both sides had
returned to the battlements by mid-July. The im-
passe over a quantitative standard gave way to an
impasse over the degree of flexibility for stations
under the three-hour processing guideline. After
the FCC's Mass Media Bureau staff had prepared
and circulated a draft order adopting the new
rules, Commissioner Quello complained to the
150 Id. at 1.
151 Mifflin, supra note 146.
152 Lawrie Mifflin, Shift on Children's TV Programs Will
Lead to 3-Hour Minimum, N.Y. TIMES, June 15, 1996, at 11.
Commissioner Quello's motivation for depolarizing the issue
via new flexibility on his part likely must await his memoirs.
Nonetheless, by late May, the political landscape offered him
no comfort. The President's unprecedented interest in the
issue, Congressman Markey's increasing support from Re-
publican colleagues, and a politically-correct silence from Re-
publican quarters normally vociferous about over-regulation
and preservation of First Amendment values were beginning
to leave Commissioner Quello (as well as Commissioner
Chong) very lonely in his resistance to quantification. Always
astute politically, the dean of the Commission in all likeli-
hood did not relish wrapping up his distinguished career
with a futile, divisive struggle against long political odds.
153 Clinton 'Invites' Entertainment Industry to D.C. Again,
COMMUNICATIONs DAILY, June 12, 1996, at 1.
154 Mifflin, Shift on Children's TV Program, supra note 152.
155 Impasse Develops at FCC Over Flexibility in Children's TV
Rules, COMMUNIcATIONs DAILY, July 11, 1996, at 1.
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Chairman that the draft order, written initially to
the Chairman's specifications, contained "unex-
pected and very unwanted stuff."'5 6 The Chair-
man essentially accused Commissioner Quello of
reneging on his support for a quantitative stan-
dard, to which Quello retorted, "It's [the Chair-
man's] way or no way."15 7
Commissioner Ness, whose proposal for a
processing guideline formed the framework of
the new rule, was said to be "very pleased" with
the draft.' 5  Commissioner Chong had substan-
tial reservations and was concerned that the draft
"borders on content regulation."' 5 9  She was
hopeful a consensus still might be reached, but an
impasse again loomed large over the Commis-
sion's proceeding. Ifo
As if the substantive impasse were insufficient
fodder for the trade press, a peripheral proce-
dural issue ignited new contentiousness. After the
contretemps erupted, Commissioner Quello
called for the Commission to waive its ex parte
rules to permit the Commissioners and staff to de-
scribe the details of the draft order publicly.'16
The Chairman immediately issued a statement op-
posing any such waiver of the ex parte rules, but
suggesting (albeit conditionally) in lieu thereof
that the Commission simply release the draft or-
der in its entirety.'62 Therefore, he stated his re-
luctant willingness to release the draft order if the
three other Commissioners agreed.'6 3
Four days later, Commissioner Quello released
a statement to present his "true position and to
correct mischaracterizations by some who may not
be aware of the unprecedented over-regulatory
details of the draft Children's Television Report
and Order."' 6 4 After reviewing his concerns with
the draft, Commissioner Quello again called for
156 Id. What Commissioner Quello objected to primarily
was a staunch constitutional defense of the rules which heart-
ily embraced the Red Lion Broadcasting Co., Inc. v. FCC, 395
U.S. 367 (1969), rationale for lesser First Amendment protec-
tion of broadcasting (i.e., spectrum scarcity) - a rationale
which Commissioner Quello feared "would put broadcasters
in 'a regulatory straitjacket for the next five years . . . .'" Id.
Commissioner Quello was adamant that "[tihat's a price I
won't pay and a legacy I won't leave." Id.
'57 Id.
158 Id.
159 Id.
160 Id. Some suggested, however, that delays in Commis-
sioner Chong's Office providing suggested edits to the draft
might indicate that her edits never would be forthcoming
and that she ultimately would side with Commissioner Quello
in opposition to the draft. Id.
public release of the draft order. Again, he com-
plained:
What's also going on here is that a most worthy project,
children's educational and informational program-
ming, with strong support among the public and the
majority of broadcasters, is being cleverly manipulated
to revive outdated and discarded "scarcity" theories of
broadcast regulation ..
None of this is necessary for us to adopt a three-hour
processing guideline that will work effectively and con-
sistently with the purpose of the Children's Television
Act (emphasis in original) ....
Nevertheless, I will say again that I remain committed
to a flexible three-hour guideline for children's educa-
tional programming. I hope that the announced White
House summit on children's programming will be suc-
cessful, and that President Clinton can set the stage for
the creation of sensible, effective rules in a way that the
intractable FCC Chairman has not.16 5
The next day, Congressman John Dingell from
Michigan, Commissioner Quello's home state,
and ranking Democratic member of the House
Committee on Commerce, wrote to the Chairman
also seeking public release of the draft order.'6 6
Moreover, the Congressman stated his surprise
that "several members of the Commission have
chosen to conduct the debate about their differ-
ences of opinion in this matter through the
press."'6 7 Also on July 17, 1996, the Chairman
and Commissioner Ness issued a joint statement
presenting the proposed text of the rule changes
they favor. They expressed their "hope that facts
about the sensible reforms we support will lead to
a more informed public debate about this im-
portant issue."168 Within hours, Commissioner
Quello released a statement that, "I for one am
tired of press spin and half-truth. Let's have it all
out, and let's let people make up their own
minds."' 69 The actual draft order, however, sup-
161 Statement of Chairman Reed E. Hundt, FCC News,
July 12, 1996.
162 Id.
163 Id.
164 Statement of Commissioner James H. Quello, Re:
Children's Television Proceeding, FCC News, July 16, 1996,
at 1.
165 Id. at 3-4.
166 Letter from Congressman John D. Dingell to the
Honorable Reed E. Hundt, Chairman, Federal Communica-
tions Commission (July 17, 1996).
167 Id.
168 Joint Statement of FCC Chairman Reed Hundt and
Commissioner Susan Ness, FCC News, July 17, 1996, at 1.
169 Statement of Commissioner James H. Quello, FCC
News, July 17, 1996.
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posedly remained under wraps at the FCC's head-
quarters.
Unexpectedly, Communications Daily virtually
mooted the issue of public release of the draft or-
der. The July 17, 1996, edition reported that they
"obtained [a] copy of [the] draft order from [a]
source outside [the] Commission."17 0 The draft
reportedly ran 121 pages with 435 footnotes. 7 1
According to the report, the draft was highly criti-
cal of past FCC efforts with respect to children's
television and relies heavily on spectrum scarcity
in buttressing rules against First Amendment chal-
lenge.'7 2 The report otherwise described key ele-
ments of new rules in considerable detail.
With the White House "summit" a week away,
the Commission remained locked in impasse
mode. For the White House, the opportunity to
use the upcoming summit as the stage for an-
nouncing new FCC rules reflecting the Presi-
dent's desire for a three-hour per week standard
was fading. At the same time, broadcast execu-
tives invited to the White House hardly relished
the prospect of being chastised by a popular presi-
dent in such a public setting. Broadcast industry
lobbyists also saw significant risk in further delay-
ing what already appeared inevitable. If, as antici-
pated President Clinton was re-elected in Novem-
ber, he would appoint two new Commissioners,
both of which likely would share his position on
children's television. If anything, a FCC without
former broadcaster Jim Quello might be inclined
to adopt even more stringent requirements.
Therefore, neither the broadcast industry nor the
White House remained willing to leave the issue
of children's television to the bickering, dead-
locked Commission any longer.
170 What Shouting Is All About On Proposed FCC KidVid Or-
der, COMMUNICATIONS DAILY, July 17, 1996, at 1.
171 Id. at 2.
172 Id. at 1 ("Proof that spectrum scarcity still exists is
found in huge sums paid for spectrum in auctions, draft
says.").
173 The negotiations were conducted by representatives
of NAB and Greg Simon from Vice President Gore's office.
The accord was reached so late in the day that the Monday
New York Times reported a la 'Dewey Defeats Truman" that
"the triumph the Clinton Administration had anticipated
having as a backdrop for today's event - a new Federal Com-
munications Commission rule requiring TV stations to
broadcast each week three hours of educational program-
ming for children - has vanished. A compromise reached
among three of the four commissioners in June disintegrated
in frustration and name-calling in mid-July, although mara-
thon negotiations to patch it together again continued
throughout the weekend." Lawrie Mifflin, Scaled-Back White
The weekend before the Monday summit,
negotiators for the administration and the broad-
cast industry sought a compromise.1 73 Just after
midnight on the morning of the summit, they
reached agreement. At the White House later in
the morning the President announced that:
[Tihe four major networks, the National Association of
Broadcasters, and some of the leading advocates for ed-
ucational television have come together to join me in
supporting a new proposal to require broadcasters to
air 3 hours of quality educational programming a week.
This proposal fulfills the promise of the Children's Tel-
evision Act, that television should serve the educational
and informational needs of our young people. It gives
broadcasters flexibility in how to meet those needs ....
I urge the FCC to adopt this proposal to make the 3-
hour rule the law of the land. 7 4
FCC Chairman Reed Hundt immediately re-
sponded that the compromise could be adopted
at the FCC's next scheduled meeting on Thursday
of that week. 17 5 Commissioner Quello reserved
judgment - as did Commissioner Chong.17 6 As
Commissioner Ness - the original proponent of
the safe harbor processing guideline approach -
observed, however, Commission adoption of the
compromise was inevitable.177
On August 8, 1996, the inevitable occurred.
The FCC released its 1996 Report and Order
adopting the new children's programming rules
dictated by the compromise.' 7 8 Each Commis-
sioner took the opportunity to add their own
"spin" to the Commission's action. First and fore-
most, Chairman Hundt stated, "[T]oday's action
demonstrates our willingness to listen to the
American people and, at their request, to try to
improve the impact of broadcast television on our
country." 79 Commissioner Quello was measured
in his concurrence:
House Conference Will Follow Up on Children's TV Programming,
N.Y. TIMES, July 29, 1996, at A8.
174 Remarks at the Children's Television Conference, 32
WEEKLY COMP. PREs. Doc. 1362, 1363 (July 29, 1996).
175 Lawrie Mifflin, TV Broadcasters Agree to 3 Hours of Chil-
dren's Educational Programs a Week, N.Y. TIMES, July 30, 1996, at
A8.
176 See Chris McConnell, Kids TV Accord Reached, BROAD-
CASTING & CABLE, Aug. 5, 1996, at 5. Their reservations cen-
tered on the legal rationale, a sticking point in the lingering
impasse. Id. However, the compromise agreement ad-
dressed those concerns. Id. In return, the NAB promised
not to challenge the rules in court if the Commission's order
was faithful to the compromise. Id.
177 Id.
178 1996 Report and Order, supra note 2.
179 Id. at 10763 (separate statement of Chairman Reed E.
Hundt).
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I am concurring with the Report and Order today to
end a contentious impasse at the FCC. For some time I
have believed that three hours of children's program-
ming per week is a reasonable number, but I was -
and still am - concerned with establishing a precedent
for future First Amendment incursions.180
Commissioner Ness appeared gratified. She
stated that, "The central feature of today's ruling
is a three-hour safe harbor processing guideline,
which I have long favored. It offers broadcasters
the twin advantages of certainty and flexibility,
and it is First Amendment-friendly."' 8 ' Commis-
sioner Chong expressed reservations about quan-
tification and the "highly restrictive definition of
'core programming." 8 2 She also addressed the
process by which the Commission had arrived at
its decision:
It has been a long and tortuous road to get us all to this
decision today. Reaching this agreement has been like
making sausage. It was not a pleasant or pretty process.
The end result is palatable, however, and I am pleased
that at last we have been able to achieve this order to-
gether.'
III. THE RULES
Three distinct but overlapping measures were
adopted in the Commission's 1996 Report and
Order. First, the Commission adopted public in-
formation initiatives to improve access to informa-
tion about available programming specifically
designed to educate and inform children ("core
programming").' 4  Second, core programming
was more carefully defined.'85 Finally, the 1996
Report and Order established a processing guide-
line of three hours-per-week of core program-
ming or its equivalent.' 86
A. The Processing Guideline
The heart of the Commission's new rules is a
180 Id. at 10765 (concurring statement of Commissioner
James H. Quello).
181 Id. at 10768 (separate statement of Commissioner Su-
san Ness).
182 Id. at 10771 (separate statement of Commissioner
Rachelle B Chong, concurring in part).
183 Id.
184 Id. paras. 52-72.
185 Id. para. 76.
186 Id. para. 120.
187 See id. paras. 120, 131.
188 Id. para. 132.
189 Id. paras. 120(A), 131.
190 Id. paras. 120(B), 133. In a Category B showing spe-
cials, regularly scheduled non-weekly programs, short form
processing guideline under which the FCC staff
will review renewal applications. If a station has
broadcast three hours-per-week of core program-
ming over its license term, then the Commission
staff will approve the children's programming
portion of its license renewal application without
delay.' 7 The three hours-per-week may be aver-
aged over a six month period and may include re-
peats and reruns of core programming.' The
three hours may be demonstrated in either of two
ways, by simply checking a box on the renewal ap-
plication and providing documentation that three
hours of qualifying core programs were aired
("Category A")' 89 or by a showing of an equivalent
of three hours where "somewhat less" than three
hours-per-week Was aired ("Category B").' 9 o
If a licensee's performance does not qualify to
make a Category A or B showing, its renewal ap-
plication will be referred to the full Commis-
sion."' In this instance, licensees may show com-
pliance with the Act in other ways. They may rely
in part on non-broadcast efforts to augment the
core educational and informational programming
on their station and/or provide sponsorship of
core programming on other stations in the same
market. l2
Remedies for non-compliance with the CTA
may include, in order of increasing severity of the
level of non-compliance, letters of admonition or
reporting requirements, a renewed commitment
from the licensee with a contingent renewal based
on performance, forfeitures and short-term re-
newals, and finally, in the worst case scenario, a
designation for hearing to determine whether vio-
lations of the Act and the Commission's rules war-
programs, and educational and informational Public Service
Announcements ("PSA") would count towards the process-
ing guideline. Id. para. 133. Special consideration will be
given to such programming or core programming aired dur-
ing prime time and to broadcasters who have invested a sub-
stantial amount of money in the development of their own
core programming. Id.
191 Id. para. 135 ("Licensees referred to the Commission
should be on notice by this order that they will not necessar-
ily be found to have complied with the Children's Television
Act.").
192 Id. Sponsorship of core programming on other sta-
tions must increase the amount of core programming on the
station airing the sponsored program to exceed the mini-
mum three-hour guideline. Id.
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rant non-renewal of license.19 3
The Commission adopted a processing guide-
line because a processing guideline was "clear,
fair, and efficient."' 9 4 It clarified its expectations
of broadcasters with respect to their responsibility
to serve the educational and informational needs
of children. According to the Commission, licen-
sees now would know "with certainty and in ad-
vance" how to meet their statutory obligations
under the Act.195 Thus, the Commission consid-
ers the processing guideline an "easy-to-adminis-
ter regulatory method to determine broadcaster
compliance with the CTA . . . ."'96
Nonetheless, unanswered questions on the
processing guideline remain. For example, what
does "somewhat less" than three hours mean?' 97
Which six month period does the Commission
mean? How will the Commission monitor the in-
dustry as a whole for compliance with the Act?
The Commission based its decision to embrace
the three hour quantified concept on "inferences
that we can draw from the entire record," rather
than the amount of educational and informa-
tional programming already in the market.198 It
considered the three hour minimum to be rea-
sonable six years after enactment of the Act.'99 Fi-
nally, the Commission believed its processing
guideline remedied the "shortcomings of [its] ini-
tial rules" and provided a counter-balance to the
disincentives to airing educational and informa-
tional programming. 200
B. Core Programming Defined
The critical companion element to the process-
ing guideline is the definition of core program-
ming (i.e., the types of programs which may be
193 Id. para. 136.
194 Id. para. 124.
'95 Id.
196 Id. at 10,772 (separate statement of Commissioner
Rachelle B. Chong, concurring in part). Nonetheless, the
Commissioner expressed serious reservation about establish-
ing quantitative processing guidelines as a matter of public
policy. Id.
197 After release of the 1996 Report and Order, Commis-
sion staff clarified that "somewhat less" means 2.5 hours to 3
hours averaged over a six-month period and that in no case
would less than 2.5 hours be sufficient for staff approval of
the children's portion of a renewal application. Video tape of
Barbara A. Kreisman, Chief, Video Services Division, Mass
Media Bureau, FCC, speaking at the Legal Session at the Na-
tional Association of Broadcaster's Kids Symposium, Wash-
ington, D.C. (Oct. 2, 1996) (on file with author)- [hereinafter
counted towards the three-hour per-week. stan-
dard). The Commission defines core program-
ming as educational and informational program-
ming specifically designed to serve the
educational and informational needs of children
which satisfies all six of the following criteria:
1. Serving the educational and informational
needs of children ages 16 and under must be a
significant purpose of the program;
2. the program must air between 7 a.m. and
10 p.m.;
3. it must be regularly scheduled at least
weekly;
4. it must be at least thirty minutes in length;
5. the station must specify the program's edu-
cational and informational objective in writing
and the target audience in the station's Children's
Television Programming Report; and
6. the station must provide a listing of educa-
tional and informational programs, including the
target age group, to publishers of program
guides.20 1
Because some broadcasters had claimed gen-
eral audience and entertainment programming as
programs specifically designed to meet the educa-
tional and informational needs of children in
their renewal applications, the Commission de-
cided that its definition was overly broad and that
the requirement that programming be "specifi-
cally designed" was not being interpreted cor-
rectly by broadcasters. 2 0 2 To conform more with
the express language of the Act, the broad defini-
tion of educational and informational television
programming was modified and now encom-
passes "any television programming that furthers
the educational and informational needs of chil-
dren 16-years-of-age and under in any respect, in-
NAB Symposium Remarks].
198 1996 Report & Order, supra note 2, para. 122.
199 Id. para. 121.
200 Id. para. 129. The three year experimental filings of
yearly compilations of the quarterly children's reports that
will be evaluated. and reviewed after three years will deter-
mine future action by the Commission. Id. para. 140. In ad-
dition, the Commission will conduct audits of individual sta-
tions' performance under the new children's educational
and informational programming rules during the next three
years. Id. The Commission sees no potential sunset of these
new rules. Id. para. 141.
201 Id. at 10750 (to be codified at 47 C.F.R. § 73.671(c)).
The new core programming definition becomes effective on
September 1, 1997. Id. para. 163.
202 Id. para. 73.
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cluding children's intellectual/ cognitive or so-
cial/emotional needs." 2 03  The Commission
designed the definition of core programming to
provide licensees with "clear guidance" as to how
renewal applications will be processed. 204 Adopt-
ing a definition of core programming will pre-
cisely define programming that qualifies as core
programming and will provide incentives to in-
crease the amount of these programs. 2 0 5 More-
over, the Commission determined that in addi-
tion to facilitating public monitoring of
broadcasters, requiring licensees to state the edu-
cational and informational objectives of core pro-
gramming will ensure that the broadcasters focus
on these goals. 2 06 Likewise, identifying the target
age group for core programs will guarantee that
broadcasters focus on specific age groups and ad-
dress particular skills appropriate for that aged
child. 2 07 According to the Commission, the 7
a.m. to 10 p.m. window for airing core programs
is the time frame in which the maximum number
of children view television. 2 08 Furthermore, in
the Commission's view, programming scheduled
once a week will allow parents to anticipate and
plan for the program and therefore, the program
will develop a loyal audience. 209
Again, additional clarification is necessary if
broadcasters are to comply fully with the new core
definition and produce the results expected by
the Commission. For example, the Commission
left it to the staff to determine the definition of
regularly scheduled core programming and the
203 Id. para. 79.
204 Id. para. 80.
205 Id.
206 Id. para. 93.
207 Id. para. 95.
208 Id. para. 99.
209 Id. para. 105.
210 Id. para. 106. However, a few months after the 1996
Report and Order, Commission staff did not yet know how
many preemptions would be too many. NAB Symposium Re-
marks, supra note 197. The staff stated that if an episode of
core programming is preempted, it must be rescheduled and
notice must be given to the public if time permits. Id. It was
also indicated that an exception for breaking news coverage
and coverage of natural disasters is likely, but that sports
preemptions may not fall into the category of allowable
preemptions. Id.
211 Commission staff and the panel of legal experts ad-
vised broadcasters to not rely only on syndicators, but to view
more than the pilot or first episode of a program to make a
good faith judgment. NAB Symposium Remarks, supra note 197.
The Commission, however, will permit small stations to rely
on the documentation provided by a network or a program
extent to which this programming can be pre-
empted.210 Similarly, broadcasters have hereto-
fore relied upon their respective network's and/
or a syndicator's classification of programming as
educational or informational. May they continue
to do so?211 Why did the Commission decline to
provide guidelines on the particular age ranges of
children?212
C. Public Information Initiatives
The Commission also adopted several public in-
formation initiatives to improve access to informa-
tion on educational programs for parents and
children. 213 Commercial broadcasters must iden-
tify core programs on the air at the beginning of
each program in a manner determined by the sta-
tion. 214 Stations also must provide to publishers
of television program guides information which
identifies core programs and indicates the target
age group the core program is intended to
.reach. 215 Lastly, stations must place, on a quar-
terly basis, in a separate section of their local pub-
lic inspection files a new FCC Children's Educa-
tional Television Programming Report (FCC
Form 398).216 The report will reflect the station's
children's programming efforts from the preced-
ing quarter and its proposed efforts for the ensu-
ing quarter.217 The report also must include the
name of a designated individual at the station
who will be responsible for collecting comments
and complaints from the public concerning the
syndicator as a means to minimize any burdens in compli-
ance with the public file requirements. 1996 Report and Order,
supra note 2, at 10,745 (Final Regulatory Flexibility Analysis,
Appendix A).
212 1996 Report and Order, supra note 2, para. 95. The
Commission left the classification of age groups to the discre-
tion of the broadcaster. Id. However, at the NAB Sympo-
sium, Commission staff and legal experts agreed that basi-
cally there are three target groups, preschoolers, school aged
children, and teenagers. NAB Symposium Remarks, supra note
197.
213 When Commission staff was asked who these initia-
tives are supposed to inform, there was the simple answer,
"Moms and Dads." NAB Symposium Remarks, supra note 197.
The public information initiatives become effective on Janu-
ary 2, 1997. 1996 Report and Order, supra note 2, para. 160.
214 1996 Report and Order supra note 2, para. 52. Non-
commercial stations are exempted from the public informa-
tion initiatives portion of the new rules and from the report-
ing requirements. Id. at 10,684 n.119.
215 Id. para. 57.
216 Id. paras. 65, 68.
217 Id. para. 71.
18 [Vol. 5
PASSION, POLITICS, AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST
station's compliance with the Act.2 18 The name of
the children's programming liaison and the avail-
ability of the station's public inspection file must
be publicized.2 1 9 In addition, for a trial period of
three years, stations will be required to file their
quarterly children's reports with the Commission
on an annual basis. 2 20
Through standardized reporting and other
means, these new rules are intended by the Com-
mission to facilitate easy access by the public to
information about children's educational pro-
gramming.221 In addition, the Commission be-
lieves that the marketplace forces which led Con-
gress to enact the new law "can be addressed, in
part, by enhancing parents' knowledge . . .. ."222
According to the Commission, parents can in-
crease a program's audience by encouraging their
children to watch only if they know that a pro-
gram is educational and when it is scheduled. 223
Increasing the audience size of educational pro-
grams will ensure the commercial viability of
these programs. 224 Access to programming infor-
mation also should provide viewers with the op-
portunity to influence their local stations through
viewer campaigns to air more and better educa-
tional programming for children.225 Finally,
keeping the children's programming report phys-
ically separate from other reports in the public in-
spection file will "ensure ease of access."2 26
Again, despite the Commission's embrace of
"certainty" regarding a station's obligation to the
public, the new rules tend to raise a number of
questions. For example, the Commission set no
guidelines that address the appearance of the on-
air identifier, e.g. when at the beginning of a pro-
gram, exactly how long in duration, and what
should the on-air identifier look like?2 27 How
must the public liaison and the public file be pub-
218 Id. para. 62.
219 Id. paras. 62, 67.
220 Id. para. 68 (requiring "four quarterly reports filed
jointly once a year").
221 Id. para. 47.
222 Id.
223 Id. para. 48.
224 Id.
225 Id.
226 Id. para. 65.
227 The Commission left these specifics to the station's
discretion. NAB Symposium Remarks, supra note 197.
228 The NAB Symposium panel suggested station bulle-
tin boards, ascertainment notices, station websites and on-air
announcements as possible places to alert the public to these
new initiatives, as long as they reach the people in the com-
licized?228 What, if any, liability does a broad-
caster have if program guides misprint the infor-
mation or do not print them at all?229
IV. PRACTICAL EFFECTS OF THE NEW
RULES
If the Commission is correct in its assessment of
market incentives to produce and broadcast core
programming,230 then the practical effect of the
new processing guideline is readily predictable -
stations typically will provide three hours of core
programming per week, no more, no less. The
minimum will become the maximum. If industry
studies concerning the amount of currently avail-
able core programming are correct,23' the new
rules will actually produce a reduction in the
amount of educational programming for children
on commercial broadcast television. Further-
more, by focusing on a narrowly-defined genre of
core programming, the Commission arguably
eliminated much of the incentive to broadcast
other highly-beneficial types of programming re-
sponsive to the educational and informational
needs of children.
Neither argument appears inconsistent with the
evidence. Marketplace incentives to broadcast ed-
ucational programming for children appear mar-
ginal and even may be in a continuing decline. 232
When Congress was debating the Act in 1989, one
network executive bluntly stated that, "If the bill
passes, we're going to have to put programming
on which we will lose money on." 2 3 3 Such a state-
ment came as no surprise. CBS years before had
relegated Captain Kangaroo to its weekend sched-
ule and as "the Captain," Bob Keeshan, observed
at the time, "The marketplace has come. into
play."2 3 4 Keeshan explained that CBS had lost
munity. Id.
229 The NAB Symposium legal panel advised that the li-
censee is not at risk for violating the new rules if there are
printing omissions or mistakes by the program guide publish-
ers. See id.
230 1996 Report and Order, supra note 2, para. 33.
231 See infra note 276.
232 This is not to say that stations did not provide pro-
gramming specifically designed to serve the educational and
informational needs of children. They clearly understood
that they had an obligation to do so after the Act passed, and
they complied. See, e.g., NAB Comments, supra note 7, at 3-9;
INTV Comments, supra note 96, at 12-15.
233 Kenneth R. Clark, Will Washington Put The Lid On
Kid's TV?, CHI. TRJB., Dec. 10, 1989, § 5, Tempo, at 1.
234 Judy Mann, Kangaroocide, WASH. PosT, Mar. 18, 1983;
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millions on the show, while competing networks
broadcast profitable adult programming on week-
day mornings. 2 3 5
Adding to the disincentive for commercial tele-
vision stations to broadcast children's programs
has been the emergence of cable television with a
plethora of programming, including Nickelo-
deon, a cable network targeted at children. This
fall has already seen continued erosion of broad-
cast network children's audiences on Saturday
morning, while Nickelodeon continues to post
double-digit increases.236 Syndicated children's
programming appears to be faring no better. As
Broadcasting & Cable magazine reported re-
cently, "[d] eclining ratings for most shows, loss of
time periods, new competition from the two new
networks and the defection of older kids to other
forms of entertainment add up to a dismal state of
affairs for syndicators."23 7 These other forms of
entertainment undoubtedly include "the growing
range of computer services, new video game tech-
nologies and younger-skewing best-selling video
releases."2 38  In other words, with an ever-ex-
panding array of entertainment options, children
already seem to be viewing less and less broadcast
television, and any educational program on a
broadcast station or network will face enormous
competition from the entertainment alternatives
offered by these other media and activities.239
Dwindling audiences translate into dwindling
revenues. The opportunity cost of scheduling
children's programming, combined with the
higher costs of producing educational, but still
at BI.
235 Id. Who was notably concerned about the Captain's
plight? None other than then Congressman Albert Gore, Jr.
Id.
236 Michael Schneider, Will CBS, the Biggest Loser, Drop
Out?, ELECTRONIC MEDIA, Oct. 14, 1996, at 1, 38.
237 David Tobenkin, Tough Times for Kids Syndicators,
BROADCASTING & CABLE, Aug. 12, 1996, at 26.
238 Schneider, supra note 236, at 38.
239 Adding to the problem is the concern that children's
viewing has been underestimated by Nielsen. See Chris Mc-
Connell, FCC To Study Free Time, BROADCASTING & CABLE, Apr.
17, 1996, at 6 (quoting FCC Chairman Reed Hundt).
I'm aware that many broadcasters believe that Nielsen
Media Research, the only company of its kind, un-
dercounts younger viewers and is otherwise, in the words
of NBC's chief audience researcher, 'measurably defi-
cient in reliability, accuracy and utility.' If this is true, it
harms free TV, harms competition and harms the public
interest. I think the FCC should look into it.
Id.
240 A more optimistic appraisal is provided by
entertaining programs, creates strong incentives
for stations to abandon the genre in favor of more
lucrative fare. The Commission's fear that these
rules are necessary to assure that stations continue
to provide educational programming for children
hardly may be dismissed. 2 40
Under these market conditions, stations can be
expected to do no more than they perceive is re-
quired of them. 2 4 1 Stations will make for the
Commission's new safe harbor - three hours of
core programming per week - at top speed.
With neither an economic nor a regulatory incen-
tive to broadcast more than three hours of such
programming per week, stations will broadcast a
uniform three hours-per-week of core program-
ming and rest assured that they are in compliance
with the Act.
This action could produce two adverse effects.
First, the overall amount of core programming
actually may decline. Industry studies have shown
that stations on average have been broadcasting
in excess of three hours of educational program-
ming for children each week, the majority of
which was scheduled after 7 a.m. 2 4 2 Whereas a
few stations might have to provide additional pro-
gramming to meet the processing guideline, the
industry average will tend to decline to the three-
hour level established by the Commission, be-
cause those stations which presently exceed the
guideline may now adhere strictly to the three-
hour compliance standard.
Second, the amount of beneficial programming
which falls outside the Commission's strict defini-
Zenithmedia:
The prize will seemingly go to the network/programmer
who develops a show that entertains children long
enough to also educate them . . . . What this season -
though it has been tough on network programmers and
syndicators - has shown is that even in this time of tech-
nology-savvy, videotape-addicted, Internet surfing kids,
good television still has the power to draw them in,
although they may easily, unpredictably shift between
viewing options.
Television Bulletin Number 41, Children's Television: An Update,
Zenithmedia, (Zenith Media Services, Inc., New York, N.Y.),
Feb. 26, 1996, at 4-5.
241 What ought be questioned, however, is whether a
general requirement versus a quantitative guideline would be
the better impetus to production and broadcast of educa-
tional programming for children. This was the issue before
the Commission. The Act already imposed a general require-
ment, which had prompted stations to provide considerably
more educational programming for children. See supra note
232.
242 See infra note 276.
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tion of core programming will diminish. Stations
will have no remaining regulatory incentive to
broadcast specials or short-segment interstitial
programs, although these types of programs have
been highly responsive to the educational and in-
formational needs of children .243
V. POTENTIAL LEGAL INFIRMITIES
As a result of the compromise, 2 44 no requests
for reconsideration were filed with the Commis-
sion. No petitions for review were filed in the
court of appeals. For the moment, therefore, the
Commission's order is secure and intact. This
hardly should obscure the oft-compelling legal
case which might have been, and might yet be,
mounted against the rule.2 45
A. The Rules Impose Specific Programming
and Scheduling Requirements Which
Contravene the Scheme of Regulation
Contemplated by the Communications Act
of 1934.
1. While Cloaked in an Aura of Flexibility, the
Processing Guideline Is For All Intents and
Purposes, a Rule.
Whether read as a three hour or a two-and-a-
half hour "plus change" standard, the processing
guideline essentially requires stations to broadcast
a set amount of a very specific type of program-
ming each week. The Commission itself describes
the processing guideline as "a clear benchmark
for assessing broadcasters' performance."2 4 6
Moreover, the Commission states that:
[l]icensees referred to the Commission should be on
notice by this order that they will not necessarily be
found to have complied with the Children's Television
243 As stated in the 1996 Report and Order, the Commis-
sion "believe[s] that specials, regularly scheduled non-weekly
programs, short-form programs, and PSAs with a significant
purpose of educating and informing children ages 16 and
under can help accomplish the objectives of the Act .
1996 Report and Order, supra note 2, para. 133.
244 See supra note 176 and accompanying text.
245 Section 402(b) of the Communications Act of 1934,
as amended, provides for appeals of FCC licensing decisions
to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Co-
lumbia Circuit. 47 U.S.C. § 402(b) (1994). Therefore, while
a facial challenge to the rules may have been sidestepped via
the industry-government compromise, the prospect of an "as
applied" challenge remains in a case where a licensee suffers
sanctions from the Commission for failure to comply with the
Act.
Act. Given the modest nature of the guideline de-
scribed in Categories A and B, we expect few broadcast-
ers will fail to meet this benchmark.2 47
As Commissioner Ness emphasized, "Category
B is not a safe haven for those whose commitment
is lacking."2 4  She further observed, that the safe
harbor processing guideline is "certain, for it es-
tablishes a clear level of expectation: three-hours
- a mere two percent of the broadcast week."2 4 9
In fact, even President Clinton described the rule
as "a new proposal to require broadcasters to air 3
hours of quality educational programming a
week."25 0 A Federal Communications Commis-
sion with two new Clinton appointees may be ex-
pected to focus much more on the certainty than
the flexibility in the new rules.
Broadcast licensees will have the same tendency
to embrace certainty. No station licensee is likely
to test the "Category B" option, much less opt for
full Commission review.25' The certainty inher-
ent in attaining the three-hour threshold is com-
plemented by the broadcasters' ability to comply
without costly legal advice or extensive supple-
mental justifications.252 Moreover, given the in-
creasing value of a television station license, the
beacon of the safe harbor will be too inviting to
resist.
2. The Communications Act Contemplated Only Very
General Oversight of Broadcasters' Programming
Performance
The Communications Act of 1934 ("1934 Act")
never contemplated the application of specific
program content and scheduling requirements
on broadcast licensees. Whereas some may com-
plain that lack of definitive requirements is troub-
lesome, Congress eschewed such detailed regula-
246 1996 Report and Order, supra note 2, para. 127.
247 Id. para. 135.
248 Id. at 10769 (separate statement of Commissioner Su-
san Ness) (emphasis in original).
249 Id. at 10768.
250 Remarks at the Children's Television Conference, 32
Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 1363 (July 29, 1996).
251 Some stations may find themselves unexpectedly in
Category B if, for example, they have pre-empted one of
their core programs too often, such that it no longer may be
considered "regularly scheduled."
252 Station licensees value prompt action on their re-
newal applications. Delay leaves as cloud over the station's
status and can block approval of station sales and related
transactions.
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tion of broadcasting and contented itself to
require only that broadcast stations operate in the
public interest.253 As recognized by the Supreme
Court in Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v.
Democratic National Committee, 254 "the Govern-
ment's power over licensees . . . is by no means
absolute and is carefully circumscribed by the Act
itself."255 The Court delineated the limits of gov-
ernment control over broadcast programming,
stating that "Congress has affirmatively indicated
in the Communications Act that certain journalis-
tic decisions are for the licensee, subject only to
the restrictions imposed by evaluation of its over-
all performance under the public interest stan-
dard."2 5 6 The Court reiterated that a station li-
censee is "held accountable for the totality of its
performance of public interest obligations."2 5 7
Similarly, in Turner Broadcasting System, Inc.
v. FCC,25 8 the Court disavowed the notion that the
FCC could control content of broadcast program-
ming:
In particular, the FCC's oversight responsibilities do
not grant it the power to ordain any particular type of
programming that must be offered by broadcast stations; for
although "the Commission may inquire of licensees
what they have done to determine the needs of the
community they propose to serve, the Commission may
not impose upon them its private notions of what the
public ought to hear."
259
The Commission's insistence that stations broad-
cast a narrowly-defined category of "core pro-
gramming" arguably clashes head on with these
relatively recent pronouncements by the Court re-
stating the very limited role to which the Commis-
sion is constrained by the Act.
B. The Children's Television Act Never
Authorized or Contemplated Adoption of
Any Quantitative Measure of Station
Compliance with the Act
Congress resisted crafting the Children's Televi-
sion Act in a manner inconsistent with the basic
regime established by the 1934 Act. As the Court
pointed out in CBS v. DNC, license renewal pro-
253 47 U.S.C. § 303 (1994) (conferring broad authority
on the Commission to regulate broadcasting as the "public
convenience, interest, or necessity requires").
254 412 U.S. 94 (1972).
255 Id. at 126 (emphasis added).
256 Id. at 120.
257 Id. at 121.
258 114 S. Ct. 2445 (1994).
259 Turner, 114 S. Ct. at 2463 (quoting Network Program-
ceedings are a principal means of government
oversight of broadcasting under the 1934 Act. 260
Congress preserved that mode of regulation in
the Children's Television Act. As described by the
sponsor of the programming provision:
Under this act, the FCC will have the responsibility to
weigh broadcaster's efforts at serving the educational
and informational needs of children in their commu-
nity, both in the ordinary and comparative renewal situ-
ation. To fulfill the required standards, each licensee
must demonstrate that some educational and informa-
tional programming targeted specifically at children
was provided. Of course, it is expected that the FCC, in
evaluating the licensee's compliance with this provi-
sion, will defer to the licensees [sic] judgment to deter-
mine how to serve the educational and informational
needs of children in its community.
26
'
Senator Inouye, who managed the bill on the Sen-
ate floor in his capacity as Chairman of the Sub-
committee on Communications, similarly recog-
nized the wide discretion afforded broadcast
television licensees under the Act:
We have left the licensee the greatest possible flexibility
in how it discharges its public service obligation to chil-
dren. We recognize that there is a great variety of ways
to serve this unique audience - including program-
ming specially designed to entertain and inform chil-
dren; family and adult programming that can also con-
tribute to the information needs of children; and
cooperative efforts with noncommercial stations to pro-
duce and present educational fare. The list can be ex-
tended as far as the imagination of the creative broad-
caster and must rely on the good-faith, dedicated
judgment of the broadcaster.2"2
Thus, after the bill was passed, Senator Wirth reit-
erated:
Of greatest import . . . is the programming require-
ment. Every station must comply. Therefore, each sta-
tion in a community must offer at least some educa-
tional children's programming. No longer will such
content be relegated solely to PBS. No longer will com-
mercial broadcasters be able to get out of the responsi-
bility in that way. The nature of the content offered is
up to the discretion of the broadcaster. Leeway is
granted in deference to broadcasters' first amendment
rights, of course, and with the expectation of good-faith
judgments . 263
Congress' mandate to the Commission, therefore,
was to accord broadcasters the greatest flexibility
in complying with the Act.
ming Inquiry, Report and Statement of Policy, 25 Fed. Reg. 7293
(1960)) (emphasis added).
260 CBS, 412 U.S. at 110.
261 136 CONG. REc. S10127 (daily ed. July 19, 1990)
(statement of Sen. Wirth) (emphasis added).
262 136 CONG. REc. S10121-22 (daily ed. July 19, 1990)
(statement of Sen. Inouye).
263 136 CONo. REc. S16340 (daily ed. Oct. 22, 1990)
(statement of Sen. Wirth).
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The Commission embraced this mandate ex-
pressly in its initial implementation the Act, ac-
knowledging "the legislative intent to afford
broadcasters maximum flexibility in determining
the 'mix' of programming they will present to
meet children's special needs."2 6 4 The Commis-
sion similarly recognized "the open-minded per-
spective taken in the legislative history, a perspec-
tive consistent with allowing sufficient breadth of
discretion for licensee creativity and sensitivity to
community needs to develop." 2 6 5
Congress's disdain for quantitative require-
ments vis-a-vis the children's programming re-
quirement was abundantly clear. A quantitative
requirement was anathema. Senator Inouye
stated unambiguously that, "The committee does
not intend that the FCC interpret this legislation
as requiring or mandating quantification stan-
dards governing the amount or placement of chil-
dren's educational and informational program-
ming that a broadcast licensee must air to pass a
license renewal review pursuant to this legisla-
tion."2 6 6  Senator Inouye's counterpart in the
House of Representatives, none other than Con-
gressman Edward Markey, echoed the view that a
quantitative measure clashed with the congres-
sional intent that the Commission examine a li-
censee's overall service to children. Congressman
Markey stated, "The legislation does not require
the FCC to set quantitative guidelines for educa-
tional programming, but instead, requires the
Commission to base its decision upon an evalua-
tion of a station's overall service to children."267
Congressman Al Swift, a member of the Telecom-
munications Subcommittee, also emphasized the
general obligation placed on stations in lieu of
specific requirements:
The other thing this bill does, importantly, is to suggest
that local television stations, when they determine what
it is they do to provide service to the community in
264 1991 Report and Order, supra note 78, para. 18.
265 Id. para. 20.
266 136 CONG. REc. S10122 (daily ed. July 19, 1990)
(statement of Sen. Inouye).
267 136 CONG. REc. H8537 (daily ed. Oct. 1, 1990) (state-
ment of Rep. Markey).
268 136 CONG. REc. H5246 (daily ed. July 23, 1990)
(statement of Rep. Swift).
269 See House Report, supra note 23, at 17 ("The committee
does not intend that the FCC interpret this [legislation] as
requiring or mandating a quantification standard governing
the amount or placement of children's educational and in-
formational programming that a broadcast licensee must air
to pass a license renewal review pursuant to this . . . legisla-
which they are licensed, consider children as an impor-
tant audience to which they must respond. It does not
dictate specific amounts of time that will be devoted to
children's programming; it does not dictate what kinds
of programming must be used. It simply says, in mak-
ing that judgment, which they have to do under the li-
cense that they get from the Federal Government, to
determine how it is they are going to be dealing with
the community in which they serve, how they are going
to provide their public service time, that children be
one of the audiences seriously considered in providing
that programming.
These two things are so elemental, so simple, so fair, so
just, so prudent and so necessary that it is difficult to
understand why anyone would have any objection.26 8
These views, expressed during the debate were, of
course, consonant with the committee reports for
the bill.26 9
In 1991, the Commission itself embraced this
view of the Act:
The Act imposes no quantitative standards and the leg-
islative history suggests that Congress meant that no mini-
mum amount criterion be imposed. Given this strong legis-
lative direction, and the latitude afforded broadcasters
in fulfilling the programming requirement, we believe
that the amount of "specifically designed" program-
ming necessary to comply with the Act's requirement is
likely to vary according to other circumstances, includ-
ing but not limited to, type of programming aired and
other nonbroadcast efforts made by the station. We
thus decline to establish any minimum programming
requirement for licensees for renewal review independ-
ent of that established in the Act.270
One easily might argue, therefore, that the Com-
mission's new quantitative processing guideline
clashes head on with the Act, the underlying Con-
gressional intent, and the Commission's own
prior perception of its mandate under the Act.
In response to such a claim the Commission
would bear the especially heavy burden of ex-
plaining and justifying a complete reversal of its
prior position. 271 In changing its interpretation
of the Act in its 1996 Report and Order, the Com-
mission provides only a terse paragraph.272
tion."); see also Senate Report, supra note 23, at 23.
270 1991 Report and Order, supra note 78, para. 24 (em-
phasis added).
271 Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F. 2d
841, 852 (D.C. Cir. 1970) ("But an agency changing its
course must supply a reasoned analysis indicating that prior
policies and standards are being deliberately changed, not
casually ignored, and if an agency glosses over or swerves
from prior precedents without discussion it may cross the
line from the tolerably terse to the intolerably mute.") (foot-
note omitted) .
272 1996 Report and Order, supra note 2, para. 129. In es-
sence the Commission offers two justifications for its new in-
terpretation of the Act. First, it says that "nothing in the stat-
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Whether it is tolerably so is a point worthy of con-
tention.
C. Certain Aspects of the Commission's Order
May Constitute Impermissibly Arbitrary and
Capricious Agency Action in Contravention
of the Administrative Procedure Act
An agency decision which is "arbitrary, capri-
cious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in
accordance with law" must be set aside.273 To
avoid such a result "the agency must examine the
relevant data and articulate a satisfactory explana-
tion for its action including a 'rational connection
between the facts found and the choice
made.' "274
. Several avenues of attack on the 1996 Report
and Order would be available under the "arbitrary
and capricious" standard of the APA. First, the
Commission's processing guideline arguably is a
solution to a problem which does not exist. Such
"solutions" have suffered especially harsh treat-
ment in the courts.275 The Commission's funda-
mental rationale is an insufficient amount of pro-
gramming specifically designed to meet the
educational and informational needs of children
and the underlying cause of such deficiency - a
marketplace failure resulting from the economic
inability of even well-intentioned stations to
schedule a sufficient amount of such program-
ming due to competitive pressures from other sta-
tions. The record before the Commission, how-
ever, arguably demonstrates that stations, at least
on average, already broadcast three or more
hours of indisputably core programming. 276 if
this could be shown, then neither of the Commis-
sion's rationales makes sense. If no shortfall ex-
utory language ... forbids the use of a processing guideline."
Id. Secondly, the Commission contends that the processing
guideline would remedy the shortcomings of its initial rules.
Id. The first argument ignores express, unambiguous legisla-
tive history. The second mightjustify a processing guideline,
but fails to address how the statute should be interpreted to
reach such a conclusion.
273 Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (A)
(1994) ("APA").
274 Motor Vehicle Mfr. Ass'n v. State Farm Mutual Auto-
mobile Ins., Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983) (quoting Burlington
Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 168 (1962)).
275 See, e.g., Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9, 36
(D.C. Cir. 1977) ("[A] regulation perfectly reasonable and
appropriate in the face of a given problem may be highly ca-
pricious if that problem does not exist.") (citation omitted).
276 The NAB and INTV studies found that stations, in-
ists, if stations by and large are providing more
core programming than the Commission consid-
ers minimally acceptable, then a requirement to
broadcast that amount of programming is a need-
less and hollow gesture. Furthermore, if most sta-
tions already are exceeding the criterion despite
the fact that a few of their competitors are doing
less, then the Commission's marketplace equaliza-
tion rationale has no basis in fact. Broadcasters
simply are not behaving the way the Commission
fears they would in the absence of a requirement.
Indeed, one might argue with some force that
the rule will be counterproductive. This "mini-
mum becomes the maximum" argument takes on
added weight if one accepts the Commission the-
sis that marketplace considerations discourage
the broadcast of core programming. In that cir-
cumstance, stations logically would be expected to
provide no more than what is actually required of
them - three hours per week of core program-
ming and not one minute more. If the average
amount of time devoted to core programming
now exceeds three hours per week, then the aver-
age will decline to three hours as every station
gravitates to the minimum level of performance
dictated by the three-hour processing guideline.
On an overall basis, however, less core program-
ming will be available - a result contrary to the
Commission's desire to increase the amount of
core programming and hardly the epitome of ra-
tional agency decisionmaking.
Pointed questions also might be directed at the
Commission's selection of a three-hour standard.
The stated rationale appears rooted in broadcast-
ers' supposed belief that the three-hour standard
is reasonable and achievable. The same could be
said of a two-hour or a one-hour requirement.
deed, were providing in excess of three hours per week of
core programming on average. RICHARD V. DucEY & MARK R.
FRATRIK, NAB, THE 1990 CHILDEN's TELEVISION ACT: A SEC-
OND LOOK ON ITs IMPACT 3 (1995) (as appended to NAB
Comments, supra note 7, Attachment 1); ASSOCIATION OF IN-
DEPENDENT TELEVISION STATIONS, INC., 1995 STATUS REPORT
ON CHILDREN'S EDUCATIONAL PROGRAMMING 11 (1995) (as ap-
pended to INTV Comments, supra note 96, Exhibit A) [herein-
after INTV 1995 Study]. The Commission discounted the re-
sults of studies submitted by broadcast interests. 1996 Report
and Order, supra note 2, para. 40. This action alone might be
considered arbitrary. For example, INTV (now ALTV) was
very sensitive to the improper inclusion of programs like The
Flintstones in stations' listings of core programming and
sought to avoid such definition problems in its survey. INTV
1995 Study, at 12.
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More to the point, if children and their parents
are the purported beneficiaries of the rule, ought
not the rationale be rooted in an effort to opti-
mize that benefit? One might presume that the
Commission would respond that when it comes to
core programming, more is better, and that the
ability of broadcasters to achieve a level of per-
formance at an acceptable cost (including oppor-
tunity cost to the viewing public as well as broad-
casters) is the only constraint on the amount to be
required. Courts, however, typically are reluctant
to presume why agencies have chosen to act in a
certain way.277
Finally, the Commission might be pressed to ex-
plain why clearly beneficial program genres have
been excluded from consideration as core pro-
gramming.278 The narrow definition adopted by
the Commission is additionally suspect because
the Act itself contemplates consideration of a
broader range of programming in evaluating a li-
censee's compliance with the Act.2 79
D. A Quantitative Standard May Violate the
First Amendment Rights of Broadcasters
Whereas the Chairman was correct in re-
minding Commissioner Quello that the Commis-
sion has applied formal processing guidelines in
the past, 28 0 the constitutionality of those guide-
lines never was tested and certainly not in the cur-
rent video programming marketplace. Judicial re-
view of the new children's programming
processing guideline would provide the opportu-
nity for a constitutional test of a quantitative
processing guideline, although the existence of
other grounds for overturning the guideline likely
would permit a reviewing court to avoid the con-
stitutional question.28 1
277 See Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 371
U.S. 156, 168-69 (1962). Appellate courts also must assure
themselves that an agency has articulated a satisfactory expla-
nation for its action. See id.
278 1996 Report and Order, supra note 2, para. 111.
279 47 U.S.C. § 303b(a)(2) (1994) ("[T]he Commission
shall, in its review of any application for renewal . . . consider
to the extent to which the licensee . . . has served the educa-
tional and informational needs of children through the li-
censee's overall programming, including programming specifi-
cally designed to serve such needs.") (emphasis added).
280 See Hundt Univ. of Pittsburgh Remarks, supra note 127,
at 6. Those processing guidelines were eliminated in the tele-
vision deregulation proceeding over a decade ago in large
part because the Commission found that the radio and televi-
sion industries on the whole were providing amounts of the
In any case, the petitioner would have to deter-
mine whether to seek reversal of the venerable,
but, perhaps, outdated standard enunciated in
Red Lion Broadcasting Company v. FCC.28 2 In
Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC, the
Supreme Court acknowledged a history of juris-
prudence that supports Red Lion's doctrine of ac-
cording broadcasting a lesser degree of protec-
tion based on the "special physical characteristics
of broadcast transmissions."28 3 Because spectrum
is limited, not everyone can be a broadcaster.
Therefore, those who are licensed to use the
broadcast spectrum may be subject to more gov-
ernment oversight than other organs of the
press. 284 The Court so far has "declined to ques-
tion" the continuing validity of Red Lion, but is
well-aware that it is a suspect doctrine.28 5
The line of attack on Red Lion is neither myste-
rious nor subtle. Whereas spectrum limitations
inherently may limit the number of persons who
may communicate to the public via broadcasting,
numerous other media now provide other means
of reaching the broadcast audience. Red Lion
was decided at a time when broadcast television
consisted primarily of a limited number of power-
ful VHF stations concentrated in large markets,
virtually all of which were affiliated with one of
three national television networks. Moreover,
broadcasting was the only video news and en-
tertainment medium. This is hardly the case to-
day. As observed by Commissioner Quello in the
heat of the children's television debate:
Today, there is a superabundance of program choices
- over 1,500 full power television stations, including 4
networks, 2 additional emerging networks, 363 non-
commercial educational stations, and more than 1,600
low power stations ....
Nor is broadcast television even the dominant player in
the video marketplace any more. Today, cable televi-
requisite programming in excess of the levels established in
the processing guidelines. 1984 Commercialization Report and
Order, supra note 3, para. 2.
281 See supra notes 275 and accompanying text.
282 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
283 Turner Broadcasting System v. FCC, 114 S. Ct. 2445,
2457 (1994) (citing FCC v. League of Women Voters of Cal.,
468 U.S. 364, 377 (1984); FCC v. National Citizens Comm.
for Broad., 436 U.S. 775, 799 (1978); Red Lion, 395 U.S. at
390).
284 Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 398. ("[Ilt is idle to posit an
unabridgeable First Amendment right to broadcast compara-
ble to the right of every individual to speak, write, or pub-
lish.").
285 See Turner, 114 S. Ct. at 2457.
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sion reaches 97 percent of all television homes and 63
percent of households subscribe. Cable's 135 program
networks, with 60 more in the planning stages, have
brought an undreamed-of diversity of programming
that responds to virtually every conceivable want and
wish. DBS, MMDS, and, soon, video dialtone systems
will augment and extend this array of programming.
Also vying for the hearts and minds and eyes of the
viewer are the Internet and VCRs, which are now in 82
percent of all homes.2 8 "
Broadcast television does remain unique in that
it is a free, locally-based, ubiquitous service. How-
ever, the emergence of other media by which
speakers may transmit programming to the public
does raise valid questions about the vitality of the
spectrum scarcity rationale - which was based on
the inability of all speakers to gain access to a
channel of communications to the public, not on
the fact that broadcasting was a free, universal ser-
vice. Any serious challenger to the new children's
television rules would find it hard to resist a head-
on challenge to Red Lion.
Even assuming the validity of Red Lion, a seri-
ous constitutional attack could be mounted
against the new rules. As noted above, the Court
in Turner repeatedly emphasized the constraints
on the Commission's power to regulate broadcast-
ing.28 7 The Court was very particular in stating
that the FCC lacks the power to prescribe specific
types of programming which stations must broad-
cast.288  The instructive examples used by the
Court hit very close to home regarding the new
children's television rules. The Turner Court de-
scribed the nature of the requirements imposed
on noncommercial licensees with respect to edu-
cational programming:
What is important for present purposes, however, is
that noncommercial licensees are not required by stat-
ute or regulation to carry any specific quantity of "edu-
cational" programming or any particular "educational"
programs. Noncommercial licensees, like their com-
mercial counterparts, need only adhere to the general
requirement that their programming serve "the public
interest, convenience or necessity." 289
The Court also cited the Children's Television Act
as an illustration of the sort of permissible, but
286 See Quello NAB Remarks, supra note 126, at 3-4; see also
Syracuse Peace Council v. FCC, 867 F. 2d 654, 684-85 (D.C.
Cir. 1989) (Starr, J. concurring).
287 Turner, 114 S. Ct. at 2463 (quoting Network Program-
ming Inquiry, Report and Statement of Policy, 25 Fed. Reg. 7293
(1960)).
288 Id.
289 Id. at 2,463 (quoting En Banc Programming Inquiry, 44
F.C.C.2d 2303, 2312 (1960)).
290 Id. at 2,462.
"limited content restraints imposed by statute and
FCC regulation" on broadcasters. 290 Notably, the
Court characterized the Act as "directing [the]
FCC to consider [the] extent to which [a broad-
cast] license renewal applicant has 'served the ed-
ucational and informational needs of chil-
dren.'" 2 9  Faced with a constitutional challenge
to the FCC's new rules, the Court would find it
difficult to distance itself from such recent elabo-
rations on its views of the proper scope of broad-
cast content regulation.
The Commission's truncated First Amendment
defense of the rules would have to be addressed.
First, the Commission says, most of the arguments
used to attack the Commission's proposals are
"not applicable" because the Commission has
adopted a flexible processing guideline in lieu of
a rule.29 2 As observed by one legal scholar, how-
ever:
For First Amendment purposes, the imposition of a
minimum number of hours of specifically defined pro-
gramming [sic] violates established constitutional
norms whether the regulatory mechanism is a safe har-
bor quantitative processing guideline. or a flat-out rule;
in constitutional terms, these two options present a dis-
tinction without a difference, for in either case the gov-
ernment is effectively imposing affirmative obligations
on broadcasters to air programs falling within a defini-
tion established by the government within time param-
eters established by the government for a minimum
number of hours established by the government.29 3
Thus, whether this is a "distinction without a dif-
ference" or a loophole of sufficient dimension to
forestall constitutional jeopardy would be a mate-
rial issue for a reviewing court.
The FCC also relies on judicial approval of rules
requiring broadcast stations to provide reasonable
access to candidates for federal elective office. 2 9 4
Like the new children's television rules, the Com-
mission asserts, the reasonable access provision
also requires stations "to air certain types of pro-
gramming they might not otherwise choose to
provide."29 5 Several distinctions might be raised
in response to the Commission's position. First,
291 Id. at 2,462 n.7 (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 303b (1994)).
292 1996 Report and Order, supra note 2, para. 151.
293 NAB Comments, supra note 7, Attachment 6, at 6-7
(Statement of Rodney A. Smolla, Professor and Director of
the Institute of Bill of Rights Law, College of William and
Mary, Marshall-Wythe School of Law) [hereinafter Smolla
Statement].
294 1996 Report and Order, supra note 2, para. 150 (citing
to Columbia Broad. Sys. v. FCC, 453 U.S. 367 (1981).
295 Id. para. 150.
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the reasonable access provision is directed at a
problem resulting from perceived spectrum scar-
city, the inability of all speakers (and in particular,
candidates) to secure access to a broadcast chan-
nel. Thus, as in Red Lion, the provision in ques-
tion was designed to assure access to viewpoints
on matters of public concern. This is a far cry
from rules effectively requiring stations to broad-
cast a specific amount of a very specific type of
programming. No suggestion has been made that
spectrum scarcity is a factor in stations' decisions
to broadcast or not to broadcast educational pro-
gramming for children. As the Court noted in
upholding the reasonable access requirement, it
was a "limited right to 'reasonable access' 2 9 6
which did "not impair the discretion of broadcast-
ers to present their views on any issue or to carry
any particular type of programming."297 Further-
more, as Professor Smolla posits, "[T]he First
Amendment 'window' opened by Red Lion and its
progeny has been limited to regulations aimed
narrowly at ensuring equality of access in public
debate and the channeling of indecent program-
ming."2 98 Second, as noted above, unlike the rea-
sonable access provision, quantitative children's
programming standards enjoy no statutory basis.
Indeed, they clash with the clearly expressed in-
tent of Congress.2 99
The Commission also asserted that the new
rules would survive heightened constitutional
scrutiny (assuming the demise of Red Lion) be-
cause they advance a compelling interest - the
intellectual development of our nation's children
- and are narrowly tailored.300 It claims the
rules "are no more burdensome than necessary to
ensure that children will be able to watch educa-
tional and informational programming."o3 0  The
Commission then emphasizes the flexibility ac-
corded stations under the processing guideline.
None of this can obscure the fact that the Com-
mission may have imposed rules to increase edu-
cational and informational children's program-
ming which not only is demonstrably unnecessary,
296 CBS v. FCC, 452 U.S. at 396 (emphasis in original).
297 Id. at 397.
298 Smolla Statement, supra note 293, at 8.
299 See supra notes 260-72 and accompanying text.
300 1996 Report and Order, supra note 2, paras. 156-57.
301 Id. para. 157.
302 See supra notes 230-232 and accompanying text.
303 Turner Broad. Sys. Inc. v. FCC, 114 S. Ct. 2445, 2470
(1994) (citing Quincy Cable TV, Inc. v. FCC, 768 F. 2d 1434,
1455 (D.C. Cir. 1985)) ("When the Government defends a
but possibly counterproductive.30 2 Indeed, as Jus-
tice Kennedy pointed out in Turner, the impor-
tance of the government's interest does not auto-
matically lead to the conclusion that a rule will
advance those interests.30 3
VI. CONCLUSION
Nothing said herein is to denigrate politics (as
usual or otherwise) or the influence of political
forces on the deliberations and decision of the
Federal Communications Commission. Indeed,
to suggest that the FCC ought remain aloof or in-
sulated from political pressure would be naive
and unrealistic. Moreover, it would deny the
need for political accountability essential in a de-
mocracy.
Similarly, no implication that the Commission
should discard or discount the views of the well-
meaning advocates of better children's program-
ming is intended. The rights and interests of chil-
dren certainly are a proper concern of govern-
ment, and the FCC would be remiss in turning a
blind eye to the needs of children.
At the same time, the FCC, as an administrative
agency, operates in a legal framework which is
designed to assure that its decisions are products
of reason and reality, not just whim, caprice, or
even the best of intentions. The Bill of Rights (of
which the First Amendment is the most promi-
nent article) also exists to assure that a
majoritarian political viewpoint does not trample
fundamental freedoms. Therefore, the Commis-
sion also must be accountable to its statutory man-
date and the Constitution. The sensitivity of the
FCC to the legal and constitutional limits on its
authority must be especially acute when, as in the
case of children's television, considerable political
pressure and undeniably good intentions weigh
heavily on the Commission's decision making pro-
cess.
Whether the Commission was sufficiently sensi-
tive to legal and constitutional constraints in
regulation on speech as a means to redress past harms or
prevent anticipated harms, it must do more than simply
'posit the existence of the disease sought to be cured."') (ci-
tation omitted); see also Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Les-
bian, and Bisexual Group of Boston, 115 S. Ct. 2338, 2350
(1995) ("While the law is free to promote all sorts of conduct
in place of harmful behavior, it is not free to interfere with
speech for no better reason than promoting an approved
message or discouraging a disfavored one, however enlight-
ened either purpose may strike the government.").
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adopting a quantitative standard for children's
television programming will remain a matter of
academic, but apparently, not, judicial interest.
Significant legal and constitutional issues will lin-
ger momentarily in the wake of the Commission's
decision and in all likelihood will fade from view.
This is unfortunate, not only because the issues
are serious and the precedent worrisome, but also
because sound reasons exist to question whether
the FCC's new rules actually will improve pro-
gramming for children.
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